Part I

and unto itself (as existence)—in short, being unto beings. If falsehood is supposed to pertain to λόγoς, then it must have something to do with the structure of λόγoς. Therefore, falsehood is determined:

1. from the being itself and its being, in connection with which λόγoς is what it is;

2. from existential comportment itself.

According to Aristotle, the condition of the possibility of falsehood is synthesis and therefore synthesis in this double aspect: in beings (whatever is there) as subject-matter-about-which; and in the very comportment of making a statement.

With regard to its structure as the uncovering of beings, truth can be divided in a corresponding way.

1. On the one hand, as uncoveredness it is a characteristic of beings themselves (and in a special way a characteristic of the world);

2. on the other hand, as uncovering, it is a characteristic of the comportment of existence.

But this comportment itself, and existence as such, is uncovered in and for itself. The phenomenon of [170] uncovering has several essential “sides.” But understanding must aim at seeing the original whole out of which and for which these “sides” (to use this superficial name) are what they are.26

According to the structure of truth itself, synthesis is oriented both to human comportment and to the subject matter that a statement might uncover.27 The problems now are: How do falsehood and truth in Aristotle become intelligible on the basis of synthesis? And what can we understand in the Greek concept of truth that is more fundamental than the traditional concept? And granted this broadening [of the concept of truth], how far will we get in understanding not just the fact that but also the reason why truth must be understood as the truth of intuition?

It is possible there are many ways to gain an understanding of the concept of truth and falsehood in Aristotle and in the Greeks generally. We wish to choose one way that will spare us a long drawn-out interpretation and instead will take us directly to the basic question

26. For “sides” in the phenomenon of uncovering, see ὄν ὡς ἀληθές ἔν διανοίᾳ [“beings as uncovered in the discursive mind” (Metaphysics XI 8, 1065a22)].

27. [This appears to be the sense of the passage. Moser (p. 359.4–6) records Heidegger as saying, “Synthesis is thus oriented to the comportment of existence and at the same time to the subject matter of the statement”—that is, (1) to ἀπόφανσις, and (2) to τὸ ὄν.]

Martin Heidegger (GA 21) Logic : the question of truth

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