On the other hand, one covers them over when, in taking them as this or that, one relates to them in a way opposite to how they are.
b6–9: The foundation of uncoveredness in beings themselves.
You are white not because we {by uncovering} take you in your presence-there as white. Rather, you are white because of your presence-there as white.
That is, only if our speech shows what-is-there do we uncover.
b9–13: The being of composite beings as their uncoveredness. Being as synthesis and unity.36
Now some beings are always-together and {in their being} have no possibility of being taken-apart; other beings are equally always-apart and have no possibility of being taken-together; and finally, there are other beings that admit of both of these opposed states {i.e., they can be-together as well as not-together}.
Granted the above, {we may deduce that} being means being- present-with {one being present with the other} and unity, and nonbeing means not-being-present-with {one not being present with the other} and multiplicity.
b13–17: Two kinds of λόγoς and their respective trueness and falseness.
Now, in the cases where {and for the very reason that} beings can be together as well as apart, the same opinion about something as something and the same declarative indication of something as something may at one time uncover and at another time cover-over.
The [same] statement itself can uncover at one moment and misrepresent at another.37 But in the case of beings that are incapable [176] of being other than what they are, the statement does not uncover at one moment and cover-over at another.
Instead, the same statement is always uncovering or misrepresenting.
II.
The answer to the problem. Uncoveredness and the being of beings in its most proper form (1051b17–1052a11).
b17–22: The being and uncoveredness of non-synthetic beings.
Now regarding being and non-being, and being-uncovered and being-covered-over, what do these mean in the case the ἀσύνθετα—
36. [During his lecture (Moser, p. 373.16), Heidegger glossed this paragraph with: “Here Aristotle determines ‘being’.”]
37. It is so due to the thing being uncovered as well as to its kind of being, which is μεταβολή [change]. That is why the same statement can uncover at one moment and misrepresent at the next, even while remaining the same statement. The identical statement is true now but false later.