Part I

things that lack any synthesis {as well as the unification that comes from synthesis}?

There is nothing to be synthesized {in these cases}, and so we cannot speak of “being” [Sein] when something-is-together-with versus “nonbeing” [Nichtsein] when something-is-not-together-with—the way we can say, for instance, that being-together-with pertains to white in relation to a piece of wood, or incommensurability pertains to the diagonal of a square.

Similarly uncovering and covering-over occur differently in the present case [of the non-synthetic] than in the previous case [of the synthetic].

b22–33: Uncoveredness and coveredness in non-synthetic beings. The crux of the chapter.38Just as “uncoveredness” is different {in ἀσύνθετα}, so too is being.In the case of non-synthetic beings, “uncoveredness” {“and coveredover-ness”—this phrase makes absolutely no sense in the text, and I am convinced it was not written by Aristotle but inserted by a scribe} entails just touching and addressing oneself to39 the unhidden.

{Affirmation—attribution of something to something—is not the same as purely and simply addressing oneself to it.}

In these cases {of non-synthetics}, not-apprehending is the same as not-touching.

Being-deceived is not possible in uncovering a pure “whatness” in itself {Being-deceived does not pertain to “whatness.” It can occur only if one’s gaze falls} on something that is just incidentally present {with the “whatness”}.

It is the same with whatever is there in-and-of-itself without any synthesis. In that case, too, it is impossible to be deceived.

Moreover, all these things are just there in the manner of simple, constant already-there-ness, without any “not yet” or “a moment ago,” for if that were ever the case, things that are simply there would necessarily come to be and pass away.

But being40 does not come to be or pass away; because if it did, it would have to come to be from something {i.e., being would be derived from a being}.

38.[Heidegger provides this note in Moser (p. 375.20–21), and in the Weiss typescript (p. 92.26).]

39. [Addressing oneself to it in a simple “utterance.” Aristotle contrasts κατάφασις (“affirmation,” attributing something to something) and φάσις (from φημί, a simple “utterance”), which can be taken as equivalent to the Latin dictio. Heidegger translates the latter as Ansprechen, “straightforwardly addressing oneself to something” or “simply referring to it.”]

40. [Here Heidegger uses Sein to translate Aristotle’s τὸ ὄν.]

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