Part I

things that lack any synthesis {as well as the unification that comes from synthesis}?

There is nothing to be synthesized {in these cases}, and so we cannot speak of “being” [Sein] when something-is-together-with versus “nonbeing” [Nichtsein] when something-is-not-together-with—the way we can say, for instance, that being-together-with pertains to white in relation to a piece of wood, or incommensurability pertains to the diagonal of a square.

Similarly uncovering and covering-over occur differently in the present case [of the non-synthetic] than in the previous case [of the synthetic].

38. [Heidegger provides this note in Moser (p. 375.20–21), and in the Weiss typescript (p. 92.26).]

39. [Addressing oneself to it in a simple “utterance.” Aristotle contrasts κατάφασις (“affirmation,” attributing something to something) and φάσις (from φημί, a simple “utterance”), which can be taken as equivalent to the Latin dictio. Heidegger translates the latter as Ansprechen, “straightforwardly addressing oneself to something” or “simply referring to it.”]

40. [Here Heidegger uses Sein to translate Aristotle’s τὸ ὄν.]

Martin Heidegger (GA 21) Logic : the question of truth

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