b6–9:
The essential foundation of uncovering in beings themselves: here uncovering is what it properly is.
b9–13:
The structure of beings themselves is understood in terms of uncoveredness. Being: synthesis and unity.
b13–17:
This text provides a sharper characterization of the possible trueness and falseness of λόγος. Statements are divided into (a) those that can be true as well as false (sometimes they are one way, sometimes the other); and (b) those that are ei-ther true or false (always one or the other).
II.
The answer: Uncoveredness and the being of beings in its most proper form
(1051b17–1052a11).
Up to this point, being and uncoveredness have been consid-ered with regard to those beings whose being is determined by “synthesis” and “unity.” Now, however: [179]
b17–22:
The question of the being and uncoveredness of things that cannot be understood, in themselves, by way of a synthesis of something with something else.
b22–33:
First of all, determining the possible uncoveredness of [non-synthetic] being. Here the opposite of uncoveredness is not coveredness, but lack of access for direct apprehension.
b33–35:
Then again, the being and uncoveredness of beings determined by synthesis: a further characterization (cf. 1051b9–13, above).a1–4:The being of things that are not determined by synthesis.
a4–11:
Applying the above to possible kinds of statement. Essential truth and factual truth.43
Our thematic interpretation of this chapter in connection with the preceding chapters and books [of the Metaphysics] must show (a) how being first attains its full and proper determination by being characterized in terms of the ἀληθές, and (b) to what extent the pinnacle of the investigation of being is thereby reached, such that this chapter constitutes the necessary conclusion about that issue.
If this concluding clarification of being is also to be the most proper one, then it must also take for its theme the being [Seiende] that is constitutive
43. This is important for the critique of historicity.