object],  but it also cannot require one, because viewing things in that way would already be tantamount to blocking our access. And at 1052a1, where Aristotle, using the clue of θιγεῖν and simple νοεῖν, poses the question about being, he gives the same answer as he does to the question about the kinds of an uncovering access to these beings. So the answer to the question about truth (uncovering) stands in for the answer to the question about being—all of this in a discussion that asks about being in the proper sense. Roughly put: Being is determined “by means of” thinking, both of them posited as identical.
This formulation, as it might be understood in modern philosophy, is certainly inadequate, but it is nonetheless noteworthy that it was precisely Schwegler who wanted to throw this whole chapter out of the Metaphysics, the very Schwegler, who as a Hegelian should have had some understanding for the fact that in a certain sense Aristotle here identifies thinking and being.
Therefore, we have now found a mode of uncovering that distances itself from the others, insofar as this truth has no possible opposite in the sense of falsehood. Or more exactly, it is an uncovering for which there is no covering-over.
c) The three conditions for the possibility of a statement being
false, taken in their interconnection
But what have we gained for the question that now concerns us exclusively: To what extent is σύνθεσις the condition of the possibility of falsehood? What help have we gotten from discussing a kind of truth that allows no falsehood as its opposite? With that kind of an issue, haven’t we strayed from the ground of our topic? No, not at all. In fact, only now do we have the basis for deciding the question. Now we can take away from the uncovering that allows no covering-over (falsehood)  all that pertains to the possibility of falsehood to the degree that it does.
The uncovering of something that is not a composite in and of itself has no covering-over as its opposite. As Aristotle says: Being deceived is not possible. There can only be a not-apprehending (ἀγνοεῖν), a notacceding, a lack of access to the being in question. But this means first of all that being deceived entails some access to the being, that is, the tendency and intention to understand and possess it. In order to be deceived, I must in general live in the comportment of uncovering. In a certain sense, I must already have the subject matter if I am to make a mistake about it. The first condition of the possibility of deception is the prior having of something.
I cannot be deceived when it comes to uncovering those “simple” beings which are always there, because here the only possible uncovering is a direct having of those beings. By the very nature of the case,