that this specific synthesis is not possible. In the case of a simple being the very possibility of synthesizing is excluded, along with this specific synthesis.
2. In the case of a being that is determined by synthesis with another, the being can be synthesized with another being that can attach to it but need not always do so. This is a being that can be this way or that, and thus different from the way it now is. When it comes to such a being that can be different from the way it is now, covering-over is based either in the being itself or in the covering-over comportment (ontically or delotically).
(a) A statement about such a being can be false/covering-over as a result of a change in the subject matter of the statement. This is an ontic covering-over. The statement itself can remain the same as regards its content and yet cover-over [because the thing has changed]. That is, while remaining the statement it is, it can become false.
(b) But the statement can also cover-over by speaking about a being in terms of what can attach to the being but happens not to be synthesized with it “at the moment” of the statement. This is a delotic covering over.47, 48
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Now it has become clear how σύνθεσις is the condition of the possibility of falsehood or covering-over. In the one case, as the [ontic] togetherness of something with something; and in the other case, as an act of showing which, along with this to-be-indicated subject matter, co-sees something that can be synthesized with this subject matter.
This synthetic showing is a showing on the basis of, and is performed within, a focus on something else. The act of showing something by focusing on something else that has the feature of “can be together-with,” is what we have already characterized as the determining act of speaking about [187] something as something—λόγoς as a statement that determines something. This brings to light an inner connection between the ontological structure of synthesis and of the
[“Delotic” translates Heidegger’s neologism delotisch, which is related to the Greek δηλοῦν, “to show.”]
48. [Here the lecture of Thursday, 17 December 1925, draws to a close, to be followed by Heidegger’s lecture on Friday, 18 December. At the very end of the 17 December lecture, Heidegger said: “[Tomorrow] we will lay out two [more] conditions of the possibility of falsehood and then bring them together with the first one. Then we will ask about the unitary root of these three conditions of the possibility. With that, we will actually encounter the possibility of truth and the understanding of being” (Moser, p. 390.15–22).]