outset, the subject matter of the determination; indeed, this persists throughout. But this act of persisting-in-having-present the about-which is, of itself, not yet an act of determining. Rather, it is a simple and direct having, and in a certain sense a θιγεῖν. For in the first place, all simple beings are, as such, accessible in a θιγεῖν; but θιγεῖν itself is a mode of access not just to simple beings, but to anything that can be had in the manner of a simple being, namely, as something whose determinations have not yet been made explicit. From the beginning, the about-which is the focus of attention precisely in the mode of not yet having its determinations made explicit—and as such, it is held onto as the basis upon which the act of having-by-determining becomes explicit.
Thus the that-about-which appears as something that encounters me within a persisting θιγεῖν, as something that is already uncovered from the outset, as something approaching in the woods. Envisioning an “as” operates within an uncovering and a holding-uncovered that already dominates such envisioning. The second condition of falsehood operates within the first.
(b) What may we say about the third condition, the ontological structure of the composite and its relation to the first condition? The ontological structure of being-composed does not pertain to beings that encounter us in a θιγεῖν, and yet at the same time, [190] Aristotle understands it as ἕν. What does ἕν mean here? It is the unity of something present and of something present-together-with-it. Compositeness is the state of being-together-with, which is possible only within the unity of a more fundamental, underlying presence. The differentiation between what is present and that as-which we encounter it (a deer) is such only within the unity of a presence that encompasses and precedes the differentiation and that lets the present being appear as differentiated. The ἕν indicates a prior presence within which alone presence-together-with is possible as a mode of presence. The third condition of falsehood is therefore founded on an original phenomenon, a primary presence.
Now, do these two phenomena49—the one to which the second condition is to be traced (prior uncoveredness) and the one to which the third condition goes back (prior presence)—themselves have a primary connection? The prior presence of a simple being, of the being of whatever encounters us, is related to that thing’s prior disclosedness, which sustains the act of envisioning. Aristotle says: being “is” uncoveredness. He lets “being” be substituted for the primary uncoveredness found in θιγεῖν. At b24, he determines the ἀληθές of a simple being via θιγεῖν,
49. [Here I correct GA 21 (p. 190.13) in light of the Moser transcript (p. 403.20–23) and the Weiss typescript (p. 101).]