The radicalized question: What is truth?
(A retrieval of the analysis of falsehood in terms of its ur-temporality)
§15. The idea of a phenomenological chronology
The conclusion that we have drawn is also an enigma.1 In other words, the conclusion of the preceding analyses has brought us, intentionally and radically, to the central problematic of philosophy. The conclusion of the investigation up to this point is not an end but a beginning.
So what does it mean that we now take the preceding investigation and the phenomena we have articulated—statement, truth, falsehood, synthesis—and relate them all as a unity back to this phenomenal context of time? If this kind of interpreting and philosophically understanding such a trivial phenomenon as the statement really is philosophical, and if we assert it to be such, then can we appeal (if it makes any sense at all) to Kant? In his Reflexionen, Kant says: “The business of the philosopher is not to give out rules but to dismember the secret judgments of common sense.” “The secret judgments of common sense”—that means those unspoken, unknown, and un-understood comportments that underlie all the daily comportments of existence. It is the business of the philosopher to bring these secret (hidden) judgments of common sense to light, and to do so in a way that dismembers them.
For Kant, dismembering, ana-lysing, means two things. In the first place he understands analysis in a very broad, formal sense where it simply means: to separate an already given thing into its  elements, to divide a particular concrete concept into the component parts that go to make it up. But “analysis” and “analytic” also have a
1. [Heidegger opened his lecture of Monday, 11 January 1926, with a 1,450-word summary (Moser, pp. 411–417) which is omitted in GA 21.]