characteristics. I am intentionally employing this strange usage—ur-temporal—because the word “temporal” [zeitlich] has been mostly claimed by natural, pre-philosophical speaking where it simply means that something runs its course, or happens, or takes place in time. However, when I say that a phenomenon is ur-temporal I do not mean that this phenomenon is a process or a movement, much less that it happens in time. Therefore, “temporal” [zeitlich] in the sense of running its course in time, is not the same as “ur-temporal” [temporale], which means first and foremost that something is “essentially characterized by time.”

When we inquire into just how far certain phenomena are essentially characterized by time, we take as our theme their ur-temporal structure—in a word, their ur-temporality [Temporalität]. The project of investigating the ur-temporality of phenomena is one that relates the phenomena to these very ur-temporal determinations and consequently (if it is a philosophical investigation) relates them to [ur-]time as such. This fundamental philosophical examination that has [ur-]time for its subject matter we call a chronology, indeed a phenomenological chronology.

Natural-scientific awareness also uses the word “chronology,” specifically for a discipline within history’s auxiliary sciences, one that deals with things like measuring time in history or issues dealing with calendars, dating, and so forth. [200] The adjective “phenomenological” attached to “chronology” is meant to indicate that this “logos-of-time,” this study of [ur-]time, has a philosophical focus and above all has nothing to do with the practice or theory of measuring time. The project of a phenomenological chronology is to study the ur-temporal determinedness of phenomena—that is, their ur-temporality—and consequently to study [ur-]time itself.

Let us now place our analysis of the statement within the context of tasks associated with such a chronology. At the moment we need not further explain the idea of this chronology as one of the fundamental areas of research in philosophical science. Least of all need we try to relate it to the other philosophical disciplines, such as we know them, so as to project a system of these disciplines with reference to this chronology. We leave all that aside precisely because it could turn out that this chronology will shake the traditional disciplines to their very roots, and so it would have been a senseless exercise to classify things in the traditional sense. We are interested only in the task that pertains to this chronology, quite apart from the role the other disciplines may have in the system of philosophy.

It’s true that no one until now has staked out the field of this investigation into chronology. What’s more, the very idea of such an investigation—and thus of its field—has not even been opened up. The clearest indication of that is the uncertainty that characterizes the philosophical employment of the concepts and determinations of time.