and sensibility leads Kant to look for a mediation, and he finds it in time. Hegel writes in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, p. 570:

This connecting [of the two, sensibility and understanding,] is again one of the most beautiful pages in Kant’s philosophy. Here pure sensibility and pure understanding, which were formerly expressed as being absolutely separate and opposed, become united. The outcome is a perceptual-intuitive understanding or an understanding perception. Kant, however, does not pull these thoughts together. He fails to perceive and grasp that he has brought the two elements of knowledge into a unity—the in-itself of a dou-ble sameness. Knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of both mo-ments. Thought and understanding remain one particular thing and sensi-bility another; and here the two are bound together in an external, superficial way, as a piece of wood and a leg might be tied together by a piece of rope.³

That is Hegel’s conception of the meaning of the schematism. He sees it as merely an extrinsic conjoining of understanding and sensibility. On the other hand he does praise Kant for having brought these two together at all, for having (in Hegel’s opinion) approximated in some way the Hegelian idea of the dialectic, although in fact Kant’s inquiry is totally different. To the degree that Kant does aim at mediation here, Hegel praises him. But Hegel has absolutely no understanding of the real meaning, the central problematic, that Kant hit upon in the schematism.⁴

* * *

There are two reasons that primarily and necessarily prevented Kant from understanding the idea of a chronology—or more exactly, that denied him a fundamental understanding of what he had de facto carried out first in the schematism and then in the Doctrine of [203] Principles. In the first place, the typically rigid separation that Kant makes between sensibility and understanding prevented him from being able to connect in any way all that falls on the side of the understanding (the transcendental apperception and all the activities of the understanding) with time. What pertains to sensibility as receptivity had to be denied to the understanding as spontaneity. Insofar as the forms of intuition, space and time, belong to sensibility, time is pushed

3. [Cf. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999; repr. from the 1895 edition), p. 441. Translation is emended here in keeping with Heidegger’s lecture (Moser, p. 424).]

4. [Here (Moser, p. 427) Heidegger ends his lecture of Monday, 11 January 1926, to be followed by that of Tuesday, 12 January, which opened with a 330word summary that is omitted in GA 21.]