kind of determination that pertains to them, time in the sense we just mentioned is something just there on hand, and it has the possibility of being philosophically interpreted in various ways.
But is this approach to time, i.e., with regard to the objective world and its processes, the only approach? Or is the primary and normative approach to be found in other possible approaches? These are questions that we have to ask, of necessity, in a fundamental explanation of the phenomenon of time. Otherwise we abandon the whole problematic surrounding time to an explanation that remains on the level of the accidental rather than the fundamental. And in the final analysis, the way of understanding time that first emerged with Aristotle and then influenced the entire tradition remains on that level—although, as can be shown, there are specific reasons why it does so.
As long as we cling to this concept of time, it will be impossible to interpret transcendental apperception in the way we want to—viz., chronologically, with regard to time. And the same goes for any activity of understanding, or of consciousness in the broadest sense. [205] But that’s the same as saying that the chronological problematic—i.e., pointing out ur-temporality in the various comportments of existence—can be worked out only if we first get free of this traditional concept of time and show that in the final analysis this concept of time is founded on an original concept of time, and also show that in existence there are specific elements that make it necessary to understand time in that urtemporal sense. If, whenever we discuss time, we remain doggedly oriented to the traditional concept of time, what little we have said about the connection of being and truth in the preceding lectures will inevitably be misunderstood, or at best not understood at all.
Our theses are:
1. Being means presence {Anwesenheit}.
2. Truth means presence-now.
3. Presence {Anwesenheit} is understood in terms of presence-now.
4. Presence-now is a mode of time.5
What does time mean? We don’t want just any definition of time. Even if such a definition were possible and available, it would be of no help. Rather, everything comes down to seeing the phenomenon of time itself in an original way. That requires its own paths and preparations, its own preliminary investigations, and it cannot be attained in a single stroke. We say that time is not merely and not primarily a schema for determining how changes get ordered. Rather, properly speaking, time is existence itself. But that is still only a sentence, just as the first thesis above
5. [Compare with the three theses at GA 21, p. 199.5–6.]