of the being of existence, and we give them corresponding terminological determinations.
The constant letting-encounter / already-having of something is existentially and a priori a being-unto and a being-familiar-with something. Tendency-unto is a being-out-unto something. Clearly, then, the second condition of the possibility of falsehood—viz., the determining by way of the “as,” or taking a look at, or the delotic synthesis—is also to be understood as a way that existence is.
The third condition concerns the entity that is to be understood, first of all by way of knowledge of the world. “World” can also mean existence to the extent that it is a [210] being [viz., ourselves] about which we can deceive ourselves—and often do, to a large measure in acts of self-deception. We don’t have to be ourselves. There can also be (and first of all is) the being that we ourselves are not, but to which we relate and with regard to which we have a [certain mode of] being.7 To come back to the first condition, mostly we have merely changed the terminology [e.g., being-unto, being-familiar-with, etc.]. This is not insignificant because it shows that, in clarifying the phenomena we understand by these terms, the goal must be to interpret the “being” that presses to the fore in such expressions as being-already-with and being-out-unto.8
* * *
Therefore, we will clarify the structure of existence to the extent that is especially necessary for understanding these comportments. The lack of such an analysis of existence is ultimately why ur-temporal phenomena remain in the dark and haven’t been understood up until now. We thereby come face-to-face with a task. . . . No, to put it more exactly: Constantly throughout this entire course, we have been really working at an analysis of this phenomenon of existence, but without saying so explicitly. In our introductory investigations of psychologism we raised the question: When, in a concrete judgment, the real act of judgment is separated from the ideal content of judgment, how are the two related to each other? There we formulated the question in such a way that we had to ask “What then constitutes the proper connection-of-being between ideal and real being?” and more precisely, “Is it even possible to ask what constitutes the bridge?”
Now this question has become concrete for us. To be sure, we already have readily available terms for such analyses of comportments,
7. [Heidegger is referring, of course, to everyday “fallenness” and inauthenticity.]
8. [Here (Moser, p. 444) Heidegger ends his lecture of Tuesday, 12 January 1926, to be followed by that of Thursday, 14 January, which opened with a 320word summary that is omitted in GA 21.]