way is “in” time, or as we also say, it “falls” within time, within such and such a time. Such-and-such-a-time is determined on the basis of an enumeration of nows.

Is care time-determined in this sense? Does “already”—taken as the structural moment of “already-familiar-with” [Schon-bei]—mean the same as “already having been”? Should we say that being-familiar-with is essentially the same as being in the now? And wouldn’t that mean (since being-familiar-with and being-in-the-world are modes of existence’s being) that existence, as being-already-with, is already no more? The result of that would be: at every now in which existence is, existence is no more—i.e., is not. Obviously we do not mean anything like that. Rather, the “already” is precisely a characteristic of existence’s being. It must determine existence’s being positively. It cannot express a being-no-longer.

Or does this “already” mean the same as “already beforehand”? Existence is already beforehand a being-familiar-with—but already beforehand in relation to what? The determination “already” should hold with regard to existence itself. But the “already” cannot mean: “already before itself.” It cannot mean that existence was already with its world before it was at all, because if existence was with its world, then it already was, and it is impossible for existence to enter into being “later” than this “already.”

Therefore the “already,” as a moment in the ontological structure of “already-familiar-with,” does not refer to or determine a being as regards any “having-been-earlier-than” or “having-been-later-than” either itself or anyone else. [242]

Correspondingly, the same holds for the “before” [vor] in the phenomenon of “being-ahead-of-oneself” [Sich-vor-weg-sein]. Again, this characteristic of “before” cannot mean that existence as care is “beforehand” in relation to itself, as if it were earlier than it “is,” for existence precisely is insofar as it is ahead-of-itself.

As time-characteristics, “already” and “before” have nothing to do with any thing that occurs “in time” (that is, in its now). They do not refer to any thing that can be determined in this now according to an “earlier than” or a “later than.” Therefore, although care is determined by time-characteristics, it is not time-determined in the sense that it occurs, as a being, “within time.” But that does not mean it is something outside of or above time. “Extra-temporal” and “supra-temporal” are only modifications of being-in-time, and they presuppose this being-in-time as what makes them possible. Therefore, care is not time-determined in this sense.

But can it be time-determined at all? What would that mean? As we have explained, care is the being of existence. Therefore, it is not itself a being, and certainly not a being “present-there.” If “already”