or objective time. We will see that this distinction between immanent/subjective and transcendent/objective time remains caught up in the understanding of time as now-time. If the now is the proper being of time, it would be consistent to say that to a certain degree time, taken as a whole (i.e., the unity of present, past, and future), has within itself an imbalanced kind of reality. There is the properly real, i.e., the present. In turn every now has (as Lotze puts it) two unequal arms of non-being stretching out in both directions: one into the past and the other into the future. But the two arms are different: the nonbeing of the past is the no-longer, and the non-being of the future [247] is the not-yet.

Lotze’s image characterizes very clearly the way the real accent of temporal being falls on the now, the now-present. In our everyday experience of time we understand it as something we use for reckoning in our concern for the world, something we can use to compute the events we encounter in the world. In this way, concernful being-in-the-world places “time” within its “calculating.” In so doing, everyday experience understands nothing more about what all this means, and it requires no further understanding as long as it manages to put time at its own disposal for purposes of calculation. In this sense, these events in the world fall “within time.”

The theoretical study of events in the world purely as incidents of movement qua change of place is one example of an independent, determinately oriented elaboration of calculative concern and time-reckoning. Movement is understood this way. Such a theoretical-calculative study of the world consists in uncovering and determining nature. In principle, natural science embraces the foundation and horizon of all concern about the world. In determining the pure processes of nature, it uses time for its calculations, in basically the same way that pre-scientific experience does when it focuses on and takes account of things in the world as regards, e.g., the basic events of the change of day and night. For the investigation of nature—i.e., physics—time is inserted into the basic formula by which physics determines its objects: s = c ∙ t [spatium = celeritas ∙ tempus]. That is, the distance covered by something in motion is equal to its velocity multiplied by the number of now-points the movement runs through as long as it persists. Here as well, the processes fall “within time” in the sense that we explained.

Now if the idea of nature is not limited to material processes but includes all processes of things present, whether they be physical or mental, then in this sense mental processes as well as physical ones fall within time. Aristotle already understood explicitly this business of the “in time” taken in this broader sense. Later [248] Kant gave particular emphasis to the fact that the data of inner (and not just outer) sense—in fact, the data of outer and inner sense—determined