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Part II

to clarify what Hegel means by “is” when he says “Space is time.” He does not, in fact, mean that they are the-very-same, even though, in his Romantic fashion, he lets this meaning mix with his own. Yes, “space is time”—but Hegel would [253] resist someone saying, “Everything spatial is temporal,” or even, “There is no such thing as space; rather, everything is only time.” Naturally that is not what “is” means in the sentence, “Space is time.”

The “is” in the thesis “Space is time” means that space has the being of time or that the being of space is determined by time—in fact, is determinable only by time. This is something Hegel does not understand, and yet he must somehow have it in mind if his thesis is to have any meaning at all. Space gets its way of being determined—i.e., the fact of its being-thought-absolutely—only from time. But something’s havingbeen-thought-absolutely is that thing’s truth. And the being of something is thought in the truth of that thing.28 That is why Hegel says: “The truth of space {i.e., its being-thought absolutely: its being} is time.” How can we understand that more precisely with regard to the phenomenon of space? Although we can’t go into a long discussion of how Hegel determines the concept of space, we will discuss it just enough to let us understand phenomenally how and why Hegel can say “Space becomes time.”29


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According to Hegel, space is the “unmediated indifference of nature’s being-outside-itself” (§254).30 By way of clarification we can say that space is the abstract multiplicity of points that could be differentiated. Space itself is not broken up by these points, but neither does space first arise from them or put itself together out of them—because the points themselves are already space. And so, even though space is determined by these points which can be differentiated and which themselves are space, space itself remains without [any internal] differentiation. The differences themselves are of the same character as what they differentiate.


28.[“Und in der Wahrheit ist das Sein von etwas gedacht” (GA 21, p. 253.11–12).]

29. [Here (Moser, p. 534) Heidegger ends his lecture of Monday, 25 January 1926, to be followed by that of Tuesday, 26 January, which opened with a 480word summary that is omitted in GA 21.]

30. [Heidegger’s words, both at GA 21, p. 253.20–21, and at Moser, p. 536.29–30, are: “Die ‘vermittlungslose Gleichgültigkeit des Außersichseins der Natur’ (§254).” That is a somewhat free citation of Hegel’s: “Die erste oder unmittelbare Bestimmung der Natur ist die abstrakte Allgemeinheit ihres Außersichseins,—dessen vermittlungslose Gleichgültigkeit, der Raum.” In English: “The first or unmediated determination of nature is the abstract universality of nature’s being-outside- itself—the unmediated indifference of that being-outside-itself—namely, space.”]

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