into the [Transcendental] Logic. Cohen attempted to comprehend the origin of all constitutive determinations of knowledge in general as rooted in the transcendental apperception. Therefore, this interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason is designated as a logic of the origin. I have already mentioned the consequences this has for the understanding of time within the problematic of the Critique. Here time can no longer be a form of intuition or a pure intuition, as Kant interpreted it. Instead, it must be understood as a category.
On the other hand, very little is gained by trying to show that, contrary to this notion, such a deduction of time from pure thinking cannot be carried out and that it is thus impossible to dissolve the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Logic.  The problem of the unity of intuition and thinking remains unsolved even today and perhaps has never been posed as a real problem at all. Only an unrelenting investigation into time in terms of its temporality, will put us in a position to clarify that what Kant understood as the transcendental apperception and placed outside of time is the basic determination of temporality itself. Only from that position can we show that the Transcendental Aesthetic is not an accidental add-on and not (as the Marburg School thought) an unassimilated leftover in Kant’s work. Instead, we can show the full-fledged necessity of the determination of time as a form of intuition. From that position, we can restore to the Transcendental Aesthetic its rights in such a way that we can bring out the unity of the problematic of the Critique of Pure Reason without doing violence to the work. In the present context I cannot present this broader interpretation. Instead I will limit myself simply to laying out for you Kant’s delineation of time according to the various directions his questioning takes in the Critique.
§23. The interpretation of time in the Transcendental Analytic
Kant’s best-known characterization of time (and the only one that is usually cited) is the one in the Transcendental Aesthetic, where time (like space) is determined as a form of intuition or as a pure intuition. These concepts have created great difficulties for understanding Kant, and in fact still do today, so long as we merely hold on to the verbalconcepts and especially the formal opposition of form and content. This is especially clear in the problem of space. Of course everyone says that when space is defined as a form, we should not understand it as a container into which content is then poured.  But this negative definition does not get us very far in understanding what is meant here in a simply formalistic way by “form.” We need to see the internal