interweaving that no philosophy (much less any particular science) can eliminate of and by itself.
In our interpretation of Kant we must make do with an expedient and put the greatest emphasis on understanding the phenomenological beginnings, and merely allude to the dogmatic problematics and theories that Kant inherited. We will especially have to forego an exposition of the actual inner connection of the two.
Our basic task will always be to phenomenologically “loosen up” the phenomena Kant has actually or presumably seen. Only within that [phenomenological] horizon will we begin to see the outline of those dogmatic theses. To use those theses as a starting point is to remain blind in principle to the exhibition of new phenomena. The best outcome such an approach can have is to notice the new opinions in contrast to the earlier ones.
Kant interprets time, like space, as a form of intuition—a form of inner intuition. The outcome of our analysis was that “form” is the unthematically and antecedently presented basis on which [281] a manifold is allowed to encounter the senses. Because the phenomenological analysis during the last lecture54 obviously could not be carried out correctly, I will repeat it now in a more extensive way, because it is also materially important for the analysis of certain temporal phenomena.
“Form”—the pre-viewed basis-on-which—has a relation to the sense-manifold, to the appearances as the indeterminate objects of empirical intuition. The appearances are indeterminate, i.e., are not determined within thinking. In this case it means that appearances are not determined in a determinate act of scientifically thinking the manifold of appearances as a unity that is nothing other than nature itself. In this regard, the appearances are indeterminate in the first instance—but they can be determined. In place of “to determine” Kant also says “to order.” Considered in relation to scientific thinking, the manifold that first encounters the senses—which is to say, the appearances—is unordered. However, in themselves the appearances in fact are ordered insofar as I am oriented to them in the lived natural world.
Kant certainly did not investigate the whole dimension of this firsthand order within the lived world. Rather, from the beginning his problematic is oriented to the determining and ordering that is carried out by scientific thinking, and in a sense he based himself on the appearances only insofar as they were relevant as the possible and necessary terrain of scientific characterization. One may choose to say that the manifold of appearances—insofar as it is a manifold—is indeterminate or unordered with regard to its determinability by scientific thinking. However, in the given appearances there is a certain articulation:
54. [Friday, 29 January 1926.]