the “taken-for-granted.” They do not show up in the arena of everyday concern and observation, even though they undergird what is immediately given. They are foreign territory to the everyday view, which always looks to what is close at hand—not just foreign, but inaccessible to that view—a state of affairs that harbors and hides the enigma for philosophy.

In a phenomenal sense, it is not just the primary arrangements—one-next-to-another and one-after-another—that do not stand out. The pre-views that are bound up with them and the objects of those pre-views also go unnoticed. Because of the essentially unthematic character of the pre-view, its object remains completely in the background, even though, given the fact of its primacy, it is always already present. Before all others, these two bases-on-which—space and time—are antecedently in view in and for every instance of a manifold being able to encounter the senses.

The foregoing should have philosophically clarified what Kant means when he says that space and time are the “within-which” of a possible order. However, he also says that space and time are intuitions (Anschauungen), (original) presentations (Vorstellungen). [289] If we take these characterizations literally, unsustainable consequences follow immediately. Space is a presentation, but in the Kantian sense: Presenting something (Vorstellen) is one of the “formal conditions of sensibility that lie a priori in the mind” (B 122–123). Yes, but we have to ask: Insofar as we experience anything spatially localized as spatially determined, do we really understand it in its spatial manifoldness by a pre-view of something mental? Isn’t it ordered, rather, on the basis of the apartness of sense data? It would seem that Kant’s manner of speaking and interpreting collide with the obvious phenomenal content of what is actually there in the pre-view. When I put something in order, am I focused on the basis for the ordering, or am I focused on some mental state of affairs: the pre-viewing as such? Kant means the basis-on-which, the object of a pre-viewing, but he is compelled to interpret it as [the subject’s] act of pre-viewing.

How did Kant come to take the pre-viewed basis-on-which as an act of pre-viewing, thereby understanding space and time as an act of presenting? Presenting something is obviously a characteristic of the mind, or in Descartes’s terms, the mens or animus. (Kant’s word Gemüt is simply a translation of those Latin terms.) So presenting, by its very being, belongs to the subject. But in defining space and time as the “wherein” of ordering, Kant also claims that this “wherein” must reside in the mind, ready [for sensations]. But why? Why is this “wherein” subjective?⁵⁸

58. [For Heidegger, the Worinnen is likewise the Worauf—i.e., that “wherein” sensations can be ordered in terms of certain relations and thus put in a certain form, is also that on-the-basis-of-which they are so ordered. Every basis-on-which (Worauf) sensations are ordered is pre-viewed antecedently to any actual ordering. Heidegger contests the position that the Worinnen—i.e., the Worauf—is “subjective.”]