how Kant emphasized, and always maintained, the autonomy of pure intuition over against the activity of the understanding. A. J. Dietrich has made most headway in interpreting this passage, in his Kants Begriff des Ganzen in seiner Raum-Zeitlehre und das Verhältnis zu Leibniz (1916).62
But I must say that in the final analysis not even Dietrich has understood the proper sense of this passage, because he tries to explain this word “given” in the note as a vague use of language instead of showing the opposite: this word is demanded by the issue itself.
So the formal intuition that Kant discusses is founded on the form of intuition. This distinction makes it clear what Kant means (on my interpretation): This possible pre-viewed basis-on-which, which is constantly unthematic in ordinary experience, can be thematized; and when it is thematic, it is a delimited field of objects proper to a specific science, namely, geometry. Now, insofar as geometry is a constitutive moment in mathematical physics and in the mathematical sciences of nature themselves, [297] this distinction will naturally have essential significance for understanding the epistemological structure of mathematical-physical knowledge.63
* * *
To return to the question of time, we must say that, as regards the philosophical understanding of time, the dogmatic argument about the a priori status of time has gained us nothing as regards the subjectivity of time. For even if we were to grant that, in distinction to space, time is in fact “subjective,” it still has not been shown how and why time as time—and not just as a form of intuition—can be the “wherein” of the ordering of all appearances in inner sense. There is nothing that explains that such time is subjective. One simply asserts that it is, using the same dogmatic arguments as with space. And above all it is not shown that time is only a form of intuition of inner and outer sense. And to go in the opposite direction, it is not even shown to what degree and in what way subjective time can at all be objective, and what this objectivity means. Only in demonstrating that do we show that a general determination of time is possible and, on that basis, an empirical determination of time.
So much for the understanding of the relevant content of the conception
62. [Albert Johannes Dietrich, Kants Begriff des Ganzen in seiner Raum-Zeitlehre und das Verhältnis zu Leibniz (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1916). The text was the author‘s Habilitationsschrift at the University of Berlin, and was issued as no. 50 in the series, Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte; the first edition has been reprinted (Hildesheim and New York: Olms, 1975).]
63. [Here (Moser, p. 606) Heidegger ends his lecture of Tuesday, 2 February 1926, to be followed by that of Thursday, 4 February, which opened with a 500word summary that is omitted in GA 21.]