he said that every finite thing (finitum) is infinitely different from the infinite (infinitum). That means there is no bridge between the two—or more exactly, the very notion of bridging them by moving forward into the infinite is itself a finite notion.

“Space as an infinitely given magnitude” means to say that space is always the whole within which all spaces are merely parts, and that all these parts are themselves space. The word “infinite” in the above determination [303] of space and time has nothing to do with determinability—i.e., has nothing to do with limits and lack of limits—because determinability entails synthesis; and as Kant says, every synthesis, even if it goes on ad infinitum, is finite—precisely as a synthesis, i.e., as a form of determining. Earlier I stressed that Kant does not use the words “infinite” and “finite” in a univocal sense, any more than he does so with “magnitude.” The reason is, in part, that throughout their history these concepts have played an important role and have undergone continual modification.

We have tried to give a phenomenological interpretation of what Kant means by his simple and lapidary propositions about space and time as infinite given magnitudes, and from what we have said, it should now be clear where the difficulties lie regarding a more precise determination of these phenomena: they lie in understanding how wholeness relates to part-ness, and in seeing which categorial modifications are possible here. As of today, even the most elementary structures of these basic concepts still elude us despite all efforts to work them out. Once again it is Husserl who has made the only independent and productive advances, in Logical Investigations, volume 2, Third Investigation, “On the Theory of Wholes and Parts.”⁶⁶

Later we will show the intrinsic consistency of these determinations that Kant gives to space and time: infinite, magnitudes, given, presented. In a different formulation, Kant says in one place that “all the parts of space, even unto infinity, are simultaneous” (B 40). This phrase “simultaneous, even unto infinity” points to the primary givenness of space as a whole. And in his Reflexionen, no. 4046, he says: “As regards potential simultaneity, time is infinite. Thus we present space as actualiter infinite.”⁶⁷

This means that in every “now” the unlimited pure manifoldness of space is present. In the “now” as such—and therefore, in time—there are no limits and boundaries by which we might determine how much [304] space could be present in a “now.” Rather, in every “now” the entirety of space can be presented. You can see that, even as we bring

66. Logical Investigations, vol. 2, pp. 433–489.67. Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, in Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 17, p. 397. [Actualiter: “in actuality” or “actually.”]