We must keep in mind two propositions: “Time cannot be a determination of outer appearances” (B 49), and “On the contrary, time determines the relation of presentations in our inner state” (B 50). So time is unequivocally denied of outer appearances and attributed to inner appearances alone. And yet in the second sentence Kant shows quite precisely that the first sentence holds only in a relative sense. He says: “Time is an a priori condition of all appearances in general” (B 50); time is “the formal condition . . . of the connection of all presentations” (B 177). But space, on the other hand, is “limited merely to outer intuitions” (B 50). Kant demolishes the limitations that he previously and explicitly expressed in the first sentence. How so?

Time is first of all the form of inner sense, i.e., of the presentations that show up for this sense. As determinations of the mind, these belong to our “inner state.” They are cogitationes. [335] The mind is a region that we “fill up” with cogitationes, with presentations. He says that “the presentations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind” (B 67).⁹⁵ But insofar as we fill our mind with these presentations—i.e., have them given to us in inner sense—they stand in the form of time. Even the presenting of the outer sense, as a mental occurrence, is something that is given in the inner sense; “presentations in themselves” are inner states, whatever they happen to be presenting. Insofar as the presentations of the outer senses, as presenting something, are mental states, they are “in time,” one-after-another—and they are so “in themselves.” As presenting, they place something before [us]; and they are presentations in the sense of that-which-is-presented. Insofar as Kant uses “presentation” in this twofold sense of the “presenting” and the “presented,” he can understand the being-in-time of the presenting in the same way that he understands the being-in-time of the presented. Therefore, the outer appearances, as they come to be the kind of presentations that, according to Kant, are given to inner sense, are themselves determined as one-after-another: they are determined in time.

Because all presentations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition . . . and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances. If I can say a priori [that is, from out of the subject] that all outer appear-ances are in space and are determined a priori according to the relations of

95. [The German “das Gemüt besetzen” can have the stronger sense of “to fill up the mind,” as well as the weaker sense of “to engage the mind.”]