space, so from the principle [Princip] of inner sense I can say entirely gen-erally: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses [all entities that are encountered], are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time. (B 50–51)96
This is the inferential reason Kant uses to show that time is the universal form of the givenness of whatever can be determined. [336] As a consequence, time becomes the first and the only possible a priori object of acts of pure a priori determining, i.e., of the pure actions of the understanding. This is why, for Kant, time becomes in a certain sense the ground from out of which he draws the objectivity of the pure forms and the empty forms of the unity of the actions of the understanding.97
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From the being-in-time of the mental (the presenting) Kant reasons inferentially to the being-in-time of the presented. Why does he make this inference at all? What requires that a time-determination be attributed as well to the appearances of our outer perceptions, i.e., to outer appearances? Answer: our natural experience, namely, that they certainly are time-determined. According to Kant’s theory they cannot be in an immediate way; and therefore he has to show that they are so “mediately,” by way of inner sense, insofar as they are states of inner sense. But this way of arguing (1) is phenomenologically unnecessary (there is no need of it), and (2) is not even conclusive, because from the fact that the mental occurs in time there follows absolutely nothing about what is presented mentally. On the contrary, if this way of arguing were legitimate, it would have to follow that even numbers are “in time,” as well as the objects of geometry (which surely have nothing to do with natural processes)—and in fact the same with everything that is thought or presented in any action of the mind: the categories, the pure concepts of understanding to the degree they are thought by transcendental philosophy—because this thinking, this presenting, these “presentations-in-themselves” are themselves also states of mind. But Kant denies anything of the sort—for example, just
96. [In citing Kant’s text, Heidegger omits two phrases from the text: (1) the Dagegen (“On the contrary”) that begins the sentence and that indicates the contrast between the limitation of space, as pure form, to outer intuition, and the more general application to time, as pure form, to all appearances; and (2) Kant’s parenthesized phrase, unserer Seelen—i.e., “(of our souls)”—the omission of which is indicated by the ellipsis above.]
97. [Here (Moser, p. 675) Heidegger ends his lecture of Thursday, 11 February 1926, to be followed by that of Friday, 12 February, which opened with a 650word summary that is omitted in GA 21.]