Part II

his research in a thematic way. Instead, as is his wont, he pursues these determinations only in a reductive fashion: they remain for him simply determinations of the mind, cogitationes of the res cogitans, determinations that now pertain to both stems of knowledge: sensibility, αἴσθησις, and the understanding, νόησις. According to Kant, this characterization of the res cogitans in terms of spontaneity and receptivity is the metaphysical or ontological characterization of the subject, whereas the determination of sensibility and understanding as, respectively, the faculty of intuition and the faculty of concepts, is the logical characterization of the subject. Kant makes this distinction in the introduction to his Logic, §5.105 Thus, when taken as ontological characteristics, receptivity and spontaneity determine the subject’s kind of being, whereas when taken as logical determinates, the faculty of intuiting and the faculty of combining determine the subject’s comportment. But from the start, their connection remains unclear. We have to ask: How are these comportments—intuiting and combining—grounded in the determinate being of spontaneity and receptivity? The possibility of both of these kinds of being of the subject (spontaneity and receptivity) must be determined in terms of this entity’s basic kind of being.106

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§29. The question about the connection between time as original self-affection and the “I think”

Our question now is about the connection between “I think” and time.107 We are looking for the answer via the path we have charted:

105.[The “Jäsche logic” in Kant, Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 9, p. 36 / tr. 546.]106. [Here (Moser, p. 690) Heidegger ends his lecture of Friday, 12 February 1926, to be followed by that of Monday, 15 February, which opened with a 330word summary that is given in part in n. 107.]

107. We are trying to bring together the characteristics of time, trying to make time comprehensible as a unified phenomenon by way of its diverse and seemingly disparate determinations. Only from that can we comprehend how the phenomenon of time comes to have such a central role in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Time is the original, universal, pure self-affection by, or being affected by, itself—original because it comes forth from oneself; universal and transcendental because it is the letting-oneself-be-affected-by . . . that antecedently underlies every specific act of being-affected-by-this-or-that; pure because time is not determined empirically-experientially by isolating its component parts, but as a whole—which likewise means: unthematically, not by way of an objectifying comprehension. It cannot be comprehended by any objective apprehension. From out of my own self I let myself be constantly affected by myself and in such a way that what affects me is not itself observed.

Time is a pure pre-viewing-of . . . Time is what is pre-viewed in the pre-viewing. Time qua time is given so unthematically that, precisely by being so given, time is the condition of the possibility of relating to entities.

In a certain way Kant sees this character of time; but time nonetheless remains basically undetermined and not valorized—something that is bound up with the undetermined-ness of spontaneity’s kind of being.

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