§31. The schematism of the pure concepts

intuited and the sensible portrayal of something that essentially cannot be depicted, seems to be clear, but on closer inspection it is inadequate. Nonetheless, we will begin with this distinction and will explain, in order, four different modes of sensibilization:

1. Sensibilization of appearances, [361] i.e., of empirically intuitable objects.

2. Sensibilization of sensible concepts, i.e., empirical concepts.

3. Sensibilization of pure sensible concepts.

4. Sensibilization of the pure concepts of the understanding.

In the fourth sensibilization, the theme of our interpretation is nothing other than the transcendental schematization, the transcendental schema that Kant understands as time, or better, as the transcendental determination of time (B 178).115

a) Sensibilization of appearances

The sensibilization of appearances happens as the simple depiction, in an image, of some specific object of experience. This is an image-ascopy [Abbild] of something in the strong sense of the term: a facsimile, a reproduction of a specific thing-out-there in an image that is painted, drawn, or produced in some other way, such as in a photograph, which is a simple copy of something that is visible in [natural] light or under illumination. The photograph is accessible through intuition: it shows me a specific—and in fact only one specific—visible object: this house, this dog, this tree. I can never photograph either “house in general,” i.e., the whole of what belongs to a house, or the way “house in general” belongs to this particular house. I always photograph only houses. The image, as Kant correctly says, has “as its aim . . . [an] individual intuition” (B 179),116 i.e., it always depicts an individual this-here.

An example of one specific kind of image-as-copy is a death-mask. (I will not go into the mask in general as a phenomenon of depiction.) The image-as-copy—the death-mask—can itself be further copied, drawn, or photographed. In the photograph of the image-as-copy [i.e.,

115.[The text Heidegger alludes to is presumably, “an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination.” (CPR, p. 272).]

116. [Kant’s sentence at B 179 focuses on the schema as a product of the imagination, in contrast to just any sense-image. Heidegger’s citation, however, takes from that sentence only what applies, by implication, to a sense-image. Cf. CPR, p. 273: “The schema is, in itself, always and only a product of the imagination. But in this case the aim of the imagination’s synthesis is not an individual intuition but only unity in the determination of sensibility. Thus a schema is to be distinguished from an image.”]

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