Part II

sensibilization of a concept, as long as we do not understand “concept” as a theoretical concept—the zoological concept of “deer”—but rather as the concept of an entity that appears along with me in my world and that, just like me, has its lived world within the world we share in common—the deer that, so to speak, is a “forest-dweller,” as contrasted with the anatomical-zoological concept “deer.”

So long as we heed this distinction between two types of concepts, and so long as we attend to the different kinds and consequences of understanding that go with these two kinds of concepts, we can certainly say that concepts are depicted in art. But by this I mean only that this sensibilization within artistic depiction is essentially different from both a mere “picture of” or a theoretical schematizing for, say, zoological purposes. In an artistic depiction, there is depicted a concept that, in the example we have been using, depicts the understanding of an existent—or better, the understanding of an entity as with me in my lived world, the understanding of an entity within the world and of its being within the world. That which is depicted is the deer’s being-in-the-forest, along with the form and manner of its being-in-the-forest. We designate this concept of the deer, and this concept of its being, as a “hermeneutical concept,” in contrast to a pure thing-concept. [365]

c) Sensibilization of pure sensible concepts

Once again we separate out the sensibilization of pure sensible concepts from the schematizing of sensible concepts. A pure sensible concept is not a thing-concept. The triangle that is drawn is never an image of the triangle in the sense of a copy but rather, in its essence, something schematized: a schema-image, a schema. One might want to say that the triangle as drawn would still be, if anything, a copy of the concept “triangle.” And in fact, in the sensibilization of pure sensible concepts—geometric concepts—the multiplicity of varieties of perspective is limited. Color, magnitude, material and the like are simply irrelevant, and moreover, the one thing that can vary—figure as such—is easier to sensibilize directly. The sensible [in this case] is, as sensible, closer to the limit [of sensibility], even though in its essence it remains fundamentally different from sensibility. Here too there is no “copy,” even though this expression is employed in a mathematical sense. That is, the drawing of the triangle is not a copy of the essence “triangle”—even less than the drawing of a dog is a copy of “dog-as-such.”

Every sensibilized triangle is a “one”—this one here—and for fundamental reasons, it never attains the generality of a concept. Moreover, as the individual triangle that it necessarily is, it is not, and never will be, a triangle within the science of geometry, whereas that specific dog in the painting could very well exist on its own as “this-dog-here.” The sides and lines [in this drawing of a triangle] are undeniably

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