governing the possibility of rendering visible and determining any quantum. In this synthesis speciosa temporis in which number is constituted, time itself is perceived, but not thematically (since that is a priori impossible). Rather, time—which has been brought into relief as “now,” and in fact as a “now-this”—provides, in these this’s, something that can be numbered as regards an amount. This manifold of “now-this’s” is not what gets numbered or counted up; rather, that manifold is the condition of the possibility of numbers themselves. Every number is, a priori, a determinate possibility of pure numbering-of-an-amount; that is, it is a rule. The function of time in this synthesis speciosa consists in providing an image—i.e., rendering visible—not itself qua time, but the this’s that correspond to every now and that are of the same kind even though each “this” is different. So the this’s are the condition of the possibility of numbering-an-amount. For every concrete act of counting up is possible only if I comprehend a multiplicity (however various its content may be) in such a way that I bring it into a pure multiplicity of mere “somethings.” Only then can I count them up. Otherwise I could never count a pear, an apple, a stone, or any other objects.

We must remember that what is counted is not the nows. That means: the word “time” in the phrase synthesis speciosa temporis is not be understood as a genitivus objectivus [objective genitive],¹³² as if time were the thematic object of the synthesis. Yet on the other hand, time certainly is the primary object that the synthesis speciosa relates to, such that in and through the synthesis, time appears-along-with. In this process of appearing-along-with and being unthematically brought into relief, time articulates pure ability to number-an-amount. Neither is time itself the numbered amount, nor will Kant say that counting necessarily needs time in the sense that it has to elapse in time. People usually interpret Kant this way, and then refute him by showing that

1. other behaviors also necessarily occur [384] over time; therefore time is not a distinctive feature of counting; and

2. Kant confuses counting and number; and numbers are not in time at all.

132. [An objective genitive is one in which the person or thing named by the modifying genitive is the passive object or recipient of what is named in the noun it modifies. A subjective genitive is one in which the person or thing named by the modifying genitive is the subject that actively possesses or is the source of what is named in the noun it modifies. “Napoleon’s defeat” expresses a subjective genitive if it refers to Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussians on 14 October 1806; it expresses an objective genitive if it refers to the defeat Napoleon suffered at Waterloo on 18 June 1815.]