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Part II

a this with the manifold of this’s with regard to “how much.” So time does not show itself in the synthesis speciosa; rather, it shows something else without showing itself, which is to say: Time is a pure image. Bringing the sequence of nows into relief provides the pure manifold of what-is-of-the-same-kind—i.e., the pure manifold of this’s—as absolutely necessary if any number is to be able to be counted at all. The being of this manifold of what-is-of-the-same-kind (i.e., of all this’s) is the pure “there is given . . .” [»es gibt«]. What is given is the very being of the “that” in the phrase “That is given” [es gibt es]. But “who” does the giving? “Who” is the es that gives? The answer is: the now.

Kant says: The schema “number” is “the production of time itself” (B 184).134 In this case “production” cannot mean first and foremost the bringing-forth or creating of a time. Rather, if this schematism is to have any sense at all, it means: the unthematic highlighting of the now, such that this “now” provides a “this.” With regard to “much-ness,” the “this” is a “so much.” The character of the transcendental time-determination in the schema “number” is time-production in the sense that we have explained. It does not mean that time is first created by counting. Time is produced in the only way it can be in the present context: it is brought forth [her-gestellt], in such a way that it can give something. Time functions as an image that does not show itself in itself as a whole, but that nonetheless shows something else. And the synthesis speciosa, as providing images, gives this image—so much so that this image, as a now-sequence itself, always gives a this.

Kant does not explain this peculiar function of time at all. Nonetheless, he calls time a “pure image.” And in the passage where he speaks of the “production of time,” he speaks of “the production of time itself in the successive apprehension of an [386] object” (B 184).135 That is the same as saying: producing time does not mean relating thematically to time itself; rather, it is the production of time in the apprehension.136 On the other hand, this conception of the schema “number” and its relation to time provides a strong occasion for the usual misunderstandings, as if Kant were saying: “In comprehending, one-after-another, objects in the broadest sense, time is used and this counting runs its course over time.”

But we can also understand “object” [Gegenstand] in a quite broad sense, and in this case as “the ‘this’ that shows up in the now.” And we can take “apprehension” as “pure apprehension” (cf. A 100) of a manifold.


134. [Heidegger omits the word synthesis: „. . . die Erzeugung, (Synthesis) der Zeit selbst.“]

135. [Again Heidegger omits “(Synthesis)” after “production.” The italics are mine.]

136. [Here following Moser, p. 775.9–10.]


Martin Heidegger (GA 21) Logic : the question of truth

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