The schema of reality is sensation, sensatio. In this schema—i.e., in this synthesis speciosa temporis—what is pre-viewed in the pre-view is reality. So we have a synthesis speciosa temporis secundum realitatem [synthesis that forms an image of time corresponding to reality]. And here again, the schema is nothing but a rule for a real thing being able to appear in and through the image of time: per speciem temporis.

But what is meant by reality as a pure concept of understanding, prior to sensibilization? Kant says that reality is “what corresponds to a sensation in general” (B 182). Reality “indicates” something present “in time.” Something present, as present in time, is present for a while. The question, “For how long a while?” or more precisely, “How long a while is the time [of its presence]?” or “Is that ‘while’ determined?”—all are, a priori, a matter of indifference. This present thing (which has a “while” of this or that length) is related to its “while” (however long or short it may be) by filling up a period of time. It is the present, real something, that fills up that period of time. And that something which, as a present “what,” fills up a certain length of time is what Kant calls a res, a “something,” a “thing” in the broadest sense. The essence of this res, this thing—i.e., its reality, or as Kant says, [388] “thing-ness” [Sachheit]—consists in the fact that it is a filler-of-time. The question now is how time functions as a pure image in the schema of reality (and thus in sensation), or: how time sensibilizes the concept of the understanding called “reality.”

Time again is to be taken preliminarily as the pure multiplicity of the now-sequence. However, in the synthesis speciosa secundum realitatem [synthesis that provides an image corresponding to reality], this pure multiplicity of the now-sequence is to be taken in another perspective. Every now is of the same kind as every other now, while, at the same time, being this now. But also, every now is essentially now-something, now-something-else,¹³⁹ prescinding from what the “something” or “something-else” is and even from that the fact that this something is a “this.” (Just to briefly note this in passing: You can already see that the first schematism, the now-this, in a certain sense presupposes—or in any case, is co-original with—this second schematism, i.e., this now-structure where every now is a now-something.) In the present case it is a matter of highlighting the now insofar as the now is understood as a now-something. But even a now-nothing is a now-something—that is, the now-nothing is a privation of a now-something. A now-nothing is possible only on the basis of the now in general, which is, in its essence, a now-something.

139. [The German Jetzt-Das might be rendered as “now-this,” however, that would confuse Jetzt-Das and Jetzt-Dieses; hence, I render Jetzt-Das as “now-something” and (when it is repeated) “now-something-else.”]