§34. Persistence as the schema of substance

§34. Persistence as the schema of substance

The third schema that Kant discusses is the schema of substance, and he formulates it as persistence, or more precisely, as the persistent, the perdurabile. The persistent is that in which substance shows up: the persistent is the temporal image of this category. This schema is the rule governing the showing-up of a persistent real thing. This rule is, once again, a transcendental time-determination; and so it is a highlighting of the now-sequence with regard to substance as the underlying. But here again, time itself is not thematic. Instead, what stands in view here in the categorial pre-view of substance is, as before, the sequence of nows, which, according to its essence, is “now-something,” now-something-else . . . That means:

• this “something” that shows up in the pure image of the sequence of nows with regard to the “under-lying” [sub-stance],

• this “something,” as that which under-lies in every now, or more exactly, as that which under-lies every particular “something” that can be intended in any now,

• this pre-eminent “something” as the under-lying in and for every now, is, in every now, the ever-continuing, persistent under-lying.141

This permanent something that is and shows up as the “there” [das Da] in every now is, for that very reason, always already “there” [da] for every now that comes along. It is the unchangeable, the constantly already-present. It is that in terms of which every determinable “this” of a determinate now is a priori determined. The phrase, “Now, when this or that specific thing happens . . .” means exactly the same as: “Now, when nature itself is always already present as that wherein the specific event is occurring.”

Kant’s explanation of this schema is noticeably briefer than his explanations of the previous two schemata. Besides, the proper features of this schema, both as a schema and as a rule, remain undetermined. That is, it does not emerge how we are to understand the synthesis speciosa temporis that is proper to this schema. He does not tell us what corresponds to this schema the way time-production and time-fulfilling correspond, respectively, to the previous two schemata. We look in vain for a delineation of the time-feature corresponding to substance. In his summarizing characterization of the schemata, [392] Kant merely says that this schema would present “the relations of perceptions among themselves at all time (i.e., in accordance with a rule of

141. [Following Moser, p. 783.22–25: “ausgezeichnete; ist.”]

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