time-determination)” (B 184). From that it is easy to gather that the synthesis speciosa temporis of substance is related to time in the sense of the whole of time.
We must remember that the same connection was mentioned in the demonstration of the First Analogy. There it was a question of the production of the a priori condition of possibility of an empirical timedetermination. But these a priori conditions for an empirical time- determination—i.e., the three Analogies—are, for their part, possible only if their own possibility is already demonstrated—i.e., only if it is shown beforehand and in general that, as an action of the understanding, determining qua determining can relate to appearances. The condition of possibility for principles of empirical time-determination is the schematism of the understanding itself.
These connections between (1) empirical time-determination, (2) the principles, i.e., the Analogies as the principles of the pure determination of time, and (3) the schematism, which alone is supposed to make possible this pure time-determination, are obscured in Kant by the fact that he uses the term “time-determination” in various senses. The expression and what it means have their origin in the empirical time-determination, which we understand as time-reckoning—i.e., as a measuring and determining of an appearance’s being-in-time. That is to be distinguished from the a priori time-determination; but even this latter term has many meanings. In one case it means the relation of the synthesis speciosa temporis to time; and just as there are various categories, so there are various time-determinations, as synthesis speciosa, that correspond to them. These time-determinations of the synthesis speciosa are what we characterize as the specifically schematic time-determinations. They belong to the schema—i.e., the figurative time-determinations. Among these, there is a time-determination that belongs to substance; that is the one whose conception we are striving for, although Kant left it undetermined. However, from the demonstration of the First [393] Analogy, we could gather that this specific figurative time-determination is the presupposition for what Kant, in the First Analogy, formulates as a principle, and which he once again calls a time-determination. This one is also a priori, but in the a priori ordering of the figurative time- determinations it is given a subordinate rank. Time-determination in this third and last sense is an a priori principle that underlies every empirica1142 time-measurement; but as such, an a priori principle is itself possible only on the basis of a referability of the concepts of the understanding to appearances in general.
In terms of their content, the three Analogies belong with the schemata of the three categories of relation—i.e., of the three categories of
142. [Following Moser, p. 786.13–14.]