to make possible an appearance in a way that makes the appearance be objectively determinable in a temporal way. In other words, it makes possible counting-up the amount of nows of the duration of a specific real thing. Its job is to make possible the objective determination of the nows of a real thing’s duration in terms of its “how much.” That necessarily requires, as we showed earlier, the ability to return to something that is already constantly there. That means always already having constant access to whatever is there. The synthesis speciosa temporis secundum substantiam is nothing but the rule for a priori already and constantly having access to something unchangeable. In other words, it is the rule for letting a self-same something encounter us in every something that is now already present. Accordingly, this schema includes a certain time-filling, a certain time-determination for the category “reality.” But this time-filling is not for a determinate duration, throughout a determinate number of nows. Rather, this is timefilling in the form of letting-something-encounter-us in every now—which entails: for every time-filling in the sense of the category of reality, for all of the prior, constant letting-the-unchangeable-encounter. In a certain way, by means of this time-filling we can help with the determining-feature of the synthesis speciosa temporis secundum substantiam that is lacking in Kant. We comprehend it as a preeminent [form of] time-filling, viz., ever-prior time-filling as the rule of every specific possible real [395] time-measurement, i.e., of every reckoning and determining of the magnitude of a real thing.

But now we see anew a connection between the three categories or, if you will, their schemata. It is obvious that with the schema of substance we have arrived at what really sustains the other two that we mentioned before.

The fact that Kant did not see the fundamental meaning of the schema of substance—indeed that (as we have shown) he left this timedetermination remarkably obscure—is the clearest indication that for him the structure of ur-temporality in general remains hidden in principle. But on the other hand, highlighting ur-temporality, as over against Kant’s doctrine of schematism and time in general, will make it clear that ur-temporality is not something invented or contrived but a field of work in which fundamental distinctions are made.

The rest of the schemata are treated only in brief fashion. This is not the place to show how Kant would have understood each individual synthesis speciosa temporis, or even how he would have spelled out the connection of these various syntheses according to their own structure rather than in the extraneous way he lists them in his artificially constructed Table. As regards the connection of the schemata of relation (substance, causality, reciprocal action) with those of modality (possibility, actuality, necessity) there are insuperable difficulties, be