§34. Persistence as the schema of substance

cause here Kant allows the borders between the two to completely hemorrhage into each other. He says that the schema of modality expresses the relation to “time itself as the correlate of the determination of . . . an object” (B 184). By contrast, he also says: “Persistence {and therefore the schema of substance} gives general expression to time, as the constant correlate of all existence of appearances” (B 266). Thus the same time-relation is claimed for the schema of modality as for the schema of a specific category of relation, that of substance. The root of these inadequacies lies not only in [396] the schematism, but in the division and derivation of the categories themselves and in their source—the Table of Judgments—whose artificial and incidental nature is shown in a remarkable way within an investigation that constantly asks for the final conditions of possibility.

We shall not go any further into the chapter on schematism itself. As regards its literary character, it is not well unified. The first sections (B 176–179) provide an insufficiently researched interpretation of schematism in the form of a popular-philosophical explanation of what should be explained throughout the whole of the Transcendental Logic. In fact, Kant carries out this rather pedantic explanation by following out the idea of subsumption, which of course is of fundamental importance for the architectonic of the Critique of Pure Reason (and therefore also for its dubious explanations).

It is no accident that Kant hit upon subsumption in this propaedeutic explanation of the schematism, since for Kant subsumption coheres in an essential way with the structure of the synthesis and of judgment. In general, judgment is only subsumption. To be sure, he did not clarify the structure of subsumption as regards its inner connection with the structure of the synthesis speciosa temporis. The usefulness of the idea of subsumption for Kant was abetted by the fact that he conceives of the a priori in a Cartesian sense.

The first one to show this duality in the composition of the chapter on schematism was Robert Curtius in his essay on “Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Philologische Untersuchung” [The Chapter on Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason. A Philological Investigation], in Kant-Studien 19 (1914), pp. 338–366. The subtitle indicates his goal: not a philosophical interpretation, but a clarification of its literary character. Curtius distinguishes in Kant a synthesis of subsumption and a synthesis of the schematism.144 Only the schematism of synthesis has any substantive meaning, and it coheres with the problematic of the Critique of Pure Reason, especially with the time-

144. [Moser (p. 793.17–18) records Heidegger saying, “the subsumption- schematism and the synthesis-schematism,” and two sentences later: “The schematism, as the synthesis-schematism, is the presupposition for . . .”]

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