to such a degree that time itself—the antecedent, constant letting-something-encounter—is itself given, although unthematically. Because it is an unthematic relation to itself, time as the antecedent-constant letting-something-encounter-us lets the “something” be encountered as the self-same at all times.

Only when one holds fast to the genuine now-structure and observes that the primary taking-a-look at time is unthematic, does one understand what it means to say: time is an original pure and general self-affection. What does the affecting—namely, the now-sequence whose nows the taking-a-look pursues unthematically—is not something just-there, thematically comprehended and comprehensible. Rather, the now-sequence affects in such a way that it lets something be seen—but unthematically, as if the now-sequence itself were constantly retreating and disappearing in its constant referring-to. [401] This affecting is thus something like a constant putting-itself-aside and a liberating letting-something-be-seen. And the unthematic act of affecting on the part of that which affects is enacted by the very one affected. In other words, this constant, prior letting-something-encounter, this unthematic highlighting of the now as we characterized it above, is the pure act of rendering something present [Gegenwärtigen]. The now is a now-present [Gegenwart]. It is a referring to . . . , whereby it lets something encounter us and whereby it awaits something that can encounter. And the now is a now-present in such a way that it remains unthematic. Likewise, the pre-view of the now is unthematic. It is a letting-something-encounter-us—i.e., a making-present—that passes through the now. The now is neither a fragment nor a chopped-up now-point that is “merely-present,” but rather a pointing-toward-something, a letting-something-be-seen. It is neither a fragment nor generally something merely-there, but rather the basic structure of the very act of relating in the Kantian context of the knowledge of nature.

More precisely: Making-present is first of all a condition of the possibility that a “now” can become explicit as “now something” and “now something else.” Knowledge of nature (for example) is a specifically articulated way of making-present, and making-present characterizes human existence in its being-in-the-world. Only for those reasons can this human existence say “now this, now that,” when it speaks about the world and about nature (although always, as it does so, co-expressing itself, its ownmost being unto the world). Above all, on the basis of this essential expressibility of the “now-something” can the “now something, now something else” be highlighted as a pure sequence—indeed as a pure sequence of blind nows, the pure multiplicity of which is the primary understanding of time in the tradition, as well as in Kant. When we say “now,” what we are talking about with that “now” is not something just-there, as if I were talking