understands itself in terms of “having-been” (Gewesen) and so in terms of the past.94 Of course, since “having-been” depends on being-there’s grasp of itself in its possibilities, and so in terms of itself as “coming toward,” so Heidegger writes that “ ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the future.”95 As disclosive, anticipatory resoluteness allows the disclosure of being-there’s own “situation” in such a way that being-there can be concerned with what is around it environmentally and so can act upon what is present to it. In this way, anticipatory resoluteness also makes things present and, in so doing, constitutes the present (Gegenwart).96 Falling is not omitted from this structure since falling finds its own basis in “making present.”97 Thus, writes Heidegger, “Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care.”98
It is notable that the temporality that is at issue here, what Heidegger calls “originary temporality” (ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit), and which is unified in terms of the “temporalizing” of temporality in the three “ecstases” of the future, the “having been,” and the present, is not itself a structure that is temporal in the usual sense. Although the three ecstases carry within them notions of “before” and “after” (this is important since it is out of the unity of the ecstases, that is, out of originary temporality, that Heidegger derives the “ordinary” temporality that understands temporality as the succession of past, present, and future), they are not themselves successive: “Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession.’ The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been.”99 To understand the ecstases as indeed successive would be to treat care as something occurring “in time” and being-there as something present-at-hand.100 Originary temporality is thus a more fundamental sense of temporality than is given in the notion of temporal succession, which means that temporal succession must indeed be a derivative of originary temporality. Originary temporality is that in which the entire structure of care and the “there”—the entire structure of “situatedness”—has its proper unity and “ground.”
In essence, originary temporality is, as the meaning of care, the meaning of disclosedness—that which makes disclosedeness possible as its origin and unity. But in this respect, the character of originary temporality is directly tied to its character as the meaning of the “there”—as the meaning, we might say, of situatedness. This is something also indicated by the way the concept of “situation” emerges in the discussion of anticipatory resoluteness, but it comes out too in Heidegger’s emphasis on the way in