Terms, where he writes, ‘Aristotle is further convinced that the problem posed by metaphysics, and indeed by all of philosophy, i.e., “what is being [ὄν]?” really comes down to “what is ousia?” since being is, first and foremost substance.’5
The difficulty here is that, when philosophy thinks being, over against beings and what is, it takes its cue from beings. Thus, whereas the difference is indeed thought, it is determined as what it is over against beings. The danger in this way of thinking is that it ‘thinks being as the being of a being from out of and unto a being’ (300/426).
To release the thinking of being from the shape given to it in terms of beings – over against beings (as beingness, as presence) – thinking as enaction needs to ‘return’ the ‘ontological difference’ to its ‘own’ place within the question ‘that historically decides metaphysics and decides about metaphysics and its inquiry’ (328/466). Therefore, the thinking of ontological difference is an unavoidable transitional moment, from within which the inquiry into be-ing takes place. Thinking must pass through the ontological difference, so that the necessity of asking the grounding question of be-ing can be manifest. Thus Heidegger writes, ‘But this task cannot be avoided as long as any way at all must be secured that leads out of the still very inadequate tradition of metaphysically inquiring thinking – into the necessarily [up to now] unasked question of the truth of be-ing’ (328/467). Working from within and out of ‘ontological difference’ simply bears witness to the fact ‘that the attempt at a more originary question of being must be a more essential appropriation of the history of metaphysics’ (329/468). For the historical unfolding as such, thought as be-ing as enowning, is the source for the ontological difference. ‘And this, man’s being-thoroughly-tuned by be-ing itself, must be experienced by naming the “ontological difference” – namely, at that point when the question of being itself is to be awakened as question’ (330/469).
One of the most revealing ways in which Heidegger says this dilemma or enigma is in section 132, entitled ‘Be-ing and Beings’ (‘Seyn und Seiendes’). This far-reaching title demonstrates the wider expansion, ‘beyond’ the ontological difference of ‘being and beings’ (Sein und Seiendes). For, whereas section 151 is entitled ‘Being and Beings’ (‘Sein und Seiendes’) – thus naming the tension/difference of the ontological
5 F.E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 150.