is working itself out as the ‘past’ in the ‘today’”56—can only occur “today” as the act that brings about concrete change and that it is the fate of “today” to have to find its way by overthrowing the factically existing situation. Moreover one must undoubtedly oppose Heidegger’s attempt, precisely at this juncture, to refer the decisive resoluteness back to the isolated Dasein rather than driving it toward the resoluteness of the act. This resolute act is not just a “modification” of existence as it has been—it is a shaping anew of all spheres of public life.
Furthermore, as thrown being-in-the-world, Dasein is in every case bound to its with-world and environment. In turn, this world is in every case rooted, as a context of meaning, in a Dasein that is concerned with and makes provision in it. But how should this Dasein be more precisely defined for the concrete context? Is it always as individual Dasein, such that there would be as many worlds as individuals? Certainly not; the world that Dasein has is a common world (even though each individual colors and modifies it). But how far does this commonality extend? It has its limits, first of all, in the historical situation. It may be that an all-inclusive “objective” world of nature is there and that it extends through all of history (for example, nature as the object of the mathematical natural sciences exists in this way); yet the historical world manifests itself as relevant only as a context of meanings, as “life-space.”57 Where, then, are the boundaries of the particular historical situation itself? And is the world “the same” even for all forms of Dasein present within a concrete historical situation? Obviously not. It is not only that the world of significance varies among particular contemporary cultural regions and groups but also that, within any one of these, abysses of meaning may open up between different worlds. Precisely in the most existentially essential behavior, no understanding exists between the world of the high-capitalist bourgeois and that of the small farmer or proletarian. Here the examination must confront the question of the material constitution of historicity and in so doing achieves a breakthrough that Heidegger fails to achieve or even gesture toward. It should be remarked that Dilthey has gone further thanHeidegger in this direction. Specifically, despite Dilthey’s recognition of the particular and unique structure of historicity, the essays published under the title of The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences58 repeatedly find themselves in their analyses running up against the irreducibly material content of history.59 A short passage may here be quoted: “Each age exhibits a distinctive structure. . . . [Each] involves a system of kindred ideas prevailing in various spheres. . . . But it must be acknowledged that the background of these ideas is a kind of a raw power that