as νόησις (M, 1032b15f.). This means, however, that the ἀρχή does not lie in the work or artifact itself, as does the ἀρχή of those things which exist "by nature" (κατὰ φύσιν) (NE, 1140a16). Furthermore, the end of the activity of making is other than the activity itself (NE, 1140b4); the finished work lies outside (παρά) the productive process (NE, 1094a6). As finished and completed, the artifact thus no longer falls within the purview of τέχνη, but has been set forth and freed for other ends. In other words, the knowledge or θεωρεῖν specific to τέχνη, as concerned with ποίησις, with the process of making, cannot wholly preserve within it the full ἀρχή of its object. The object of τέχνη, as something made, is other than τέχνη and as such already falls prey to contingency and chance (τύχη) in the very process of making. The product may turn out to be a failure, even though the artisan had a clear vision of what he or she wanted to make (cf. NE, 1140a19). The disclosure in τέχνη of the being of its object is intrinsically deficient.

Both the θεωρεῖν found in ἐπιστήμη and that found in τέχνη thus fall short in their ability to disclose the being of their respective objects. In the case of ἐπιστήμη, the deficiency is due to the fact that it necessarily refers to objects that lie beyond immediate observation (ἕξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν), proceeding via deduction on the basis of universal principles (λόγοι) already appropriated. The truths it discloses are thus in principle open to being regarded as merely "logical" truths, without any immediate or direct sighting (ἐπαγωγή) of their object being required. A prime example, as Aristotle notes, is the ability of the young to learn mathematics, for the purely formal, deductive truths of mathematics do not require any direct experience on the part of the individual (NE, 1142a15f.). And this amounts to saying that the θεωρεῖν of ἐπιστήμη is distanced from an immediate access to and presence of the things themselves. "The first principles from which scientific truths are derived," as Aristotle concludes, "cannot themselves be reached by science" (NE, 1140b32). In the case of τέχνη, the deficiency is due to the contingency that attends the translation of the εἶδος into material existence. As a result, the end product may not accord in its being (εἶδος) with the εἶδος seen in advance. In each case; therefore, there is a spatio-temporal removal from immediate presence that limits (but also enables) the disclosive ability of the θεωρεῖν involved.

Precisely such removal seems not to obtain, however, in the case of the third kind of knowledge considered by Aristotle. Φρόνησις refers to knowledge belonging to human πρᾶξις insofar as such activity constitutes an end in itself. It is described as "a disclosive disposition that occurs by way of λόγος [ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου], concerned with action in relation to what is good and bad for human beings" (NE, 1140 b7). Like τέχνη, φρόνησις belongs to the deliberative faculty of the soul, since the latter