The "not yet" and the "already" are to be understood in their "unity," that is, from out of an originary givenness for which the "not yet" and the ''already'' are determinate explicata. Determinate, because with them what constitutes the object is placed in a determinate aspect of movement. (PIA, 35–36)

Φρόνησις "holds fast" the. primary end or οὗ ἕνεκα, makes available the particular, immediate end, apprehends the "now," and prefigures or sketches out in advance the 'how' or means. Yet the discursive moments of φρόνησις are possible only because it is "primarily" practical αἴσθησις, a seeing of whatever is given in the moment. This seeing, as occurring within φρόνησις, proceeds toward the ἕσχατον, the καιρός of the moment at which the concrete action begins. This action, the πρακτόν, as disclosed within φρόνησις has at once not yet happened, in that it has yet to be achieved concretely, and yet has already happened in the sense that it is already held in readiness (as a determinate possibility) by the disclosive movement of φρόνησις. As a ἕξις μετά λόγου, φρόνησις holds an action at the ready, it enables the (futural) coming into presence of an action which, as possible at any moment, is already underway toward full concretion and already lets the situation be seen in a determinate respect with regard to its possible unfolding, its possible "movement." "Movement" here is not to be understood as movement in space, but as the coming into full presence of a potentiality.

The action or πρακτόν is constituted as this entire movement of disclosure that determines in a particular respect what is already being disclosed (coming to self-disclosure, showing itself) in the practical νοῦς or Augenblick. The ongoing disclosure that unfolds as the Augenblick of the finite situation is "held" in its full disclosive movement, and this fullness always already exceeds the determinate aspect in which it is oriented:

The ἀλήθεια πρατική is nothing other than the full Augenblick, unveiled in each case, of factical life in the 'how' of its decisive readiness for dealing with itself, and it is so within a factical relation of concern with the world that is being encountered. Φρόνησις is ἐπιτακτικ, it presents a being as the object of concern; it brings and holds within this aspect every determinacy of the Augenblick: the specific 'how', 'wherefore', 'to what extent', and 'why'. As ἐπιτακτικ illumination, it brings our dealings into the fundamental stance [Grundhaltung] of a readiness for ... , a breaking-forth toward.... The goal of this 'toward', that which is in the manner of the Augenblick, stands within the aspect of significance for ... , of possible concern, of that which is now

The Glance of the Eye by William McNeill