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Metaphysics of Principle of Reason [168-169]

soul within which representations arise that refer intentionally to images also belonging to the psychical. In that case we, like Brentano, are faced with the problem: How does the sphere of the psychical relate to that of the physical? Yet the intentionality of perceiving is not directed to an image in the soul, which then would first be brought into relation with something on hand, but it is rather related to what is on hand itself. Only when we stick to this natural sense of intentionality do we have the necessary basis for an appropriate approach. The objection could be raised that then the problem of the subject-object relation vanishes. Certainly—but to supplant the pseudo-problem is precisely what is aimed at with the conception of intentionality.

We must nevertheless make intentionality itself into a problem. Intentionality is indeed related to the beings themselves and, in this sense, is an ontic transcending comportment, but it does not primordially constitute this relating-to but is founded in a being-by beings. This being-by is, in its intrinsic possibility, in turn grounded in existence. In this way the limitations of the earlier interpretation and function of the concept of intentionality become clear, as does its fundamental significance. This concept not only brings a modification of the traditional concept of consciousness and of mind; the radical formulation of the intended phenomenon in an ontology of Dasein leads to a fundamental, "universal" overcoming of this position. From there the previous concept of intentionality proves to be a contracted conception, inasmuch as it understands intentionality to be an active relating to something on hand. This also explains the inclination to take self-reflection for an ontic intentionality directed inwards. Furthermore, because of this contraction, intentionality is conceived primarily as "to intend" [Meinen, connoting "opinion"], where intention is understood as a neutral characteristic of knowing. Thus every act of directing oneself toward something receives the characteristic of knowing, for example, in Husserl, who describes the basic structure of all intentional relating as νόησις [thinking]; thus all intentionality is first a cognitive intending, upon which other modes of active relation to beings are later built. Scheler first made it clear, especially in the essay "Liebe und Erkenntnis,"5 that intentional relations are quite diverse, and that even, for example, love and hatred ground knowing. Here Scheler picks up a theme of Pascal and Augustine.



5. [Now contained in Gesammelte Werke, volume 6, Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, edited by Maria Scheler, Bern and Munich. 2nd edition, 1963, pp. 77-98.]


The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26) by Martin Heidegger