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how or other maintains a passageway between the interior and exterior of the box by leaping over or pressing through the wall of the box. So the problem arises of how to explain the possibility of such a passage. One tries to explain it either causally, psychologically, or physiologically; or one somehow summons the aid of intentionality; or one holds the enterprise to be hopeless and one stays in the box, trying to explain, from inside it, how to understand what enters into our ideas from what is supposed to be outside.
In the latter case, still another standpoint of immanence is taken up, and the conception of consciousness also varies accordingly. But however and wherever the problem of transcendence is posed, whether in express or implicit orientation on the contrary concept of immanence, there is, in principle, the notion of the subject, of Dasein, as box-like at its basis. Without it, the problem of crossing a barrier or border would be nonsense! And it will become clear that the problem of transcendence depends on how one defines the subjectivity of the subject, the basic constitution of Dasein. Does this box-notion have any a priori validity at all or not? If not, however, why does it arise with such persistence? To put it another way, it is clear by now that transcendence is not an additional attribute I ascribe to a subject, but the question becomes whether the essence of subjectivity can be grasped, first and foremost, through a rightly understood transcendence. On the basis of the concept of transcendence we described, the one having immanence for its contrary, it becomes possible to have what is known as a theory of knowledge [epistemology]. So we call this conception epistemological transcendence. If this conception were to prove unjustified, because it rests on a hasty assumption, then the same thing is proved of epistemology as such. This is not to say that cognition would not be a philosophical problem. From this epistemological conception of transcendence, we distinguish the broadly theological conception of transcendence.
2) Transcendence can be considered the opposite of contingency. The contingent is what touches us, what pertains to us, that with which we are on the same footing, that which belongs to our kind and sort. The transcendent, on the contrary, is what is beyond all this as that which conditions it, as the unconditioned, but at the same time as the really unattainable, what exceeds us [das Uberschwangliche]. Transcendence is stepping-over in the sense of lying beyond conditioned beings.
In this case, transcendence is also a relational concept, but not