we obtain the perspective for a renewed penetration into the Platonic doctrine of ideas and for clarifying μέηεξις [participation] and the μεταξύ [the between].
In our last considerations, we realized that the character of wholeness belongs in some way to the concept of world, and we know that world should be constitutive for the transcendence of Dasein. Dasein transcends beings, and its surpassing is surpassing to world. The beings surpassed in transcendence are not, however, only those which are not Dasein. In transcendence Dasein surpasses itself as a being; more exactly, this surpassing makes it possible that Dasein can be something like itself. In first surpassing itself, the abyss [Abgrund] is opened which Dasein, in each case, is for itself. This abyss can be covered over and obscured, only because the abyss of being-a-self is opened up by and in transcendence.
But the question becomes unavoidable: What then is the world to which Dasein transcends ? How is this wholeness related to Dasein itself? Is world a realm of ideas, in some ὑπεροθράνιος τόπος [super-heavenly place], that is looked at and contemplated by a reason built into Dasein? Or is the world the totality of the ideas innate in the subject? It is already evident from these questions how the problem of the concept of world, as a transcendental concept, is fully intertwined with the problem of the subjectivity of the subject and, at the same time, with the basic ontological inquiry into being as such.
If the phenomenon which we designate as a transcendental concept is central, then it must have already come to light in some form, even if quite veiled and not formulated as such, in all genuine philosophy. There can be no doubt that the conception of the doctrine of ideas was prompted by a transcendence which was as such still latent. But it is just as evident that the conception of the doctrine of ideas could not attain the concept of world, because the ideas themselves and the relationship to them consisted solely in an intensification of one particular grasp of beings—and this grasp is intuition [Anschauung]. The look to which everything here reverts has for its correlate a definite, quite one-sided conception of being. In ἰδέα, θεωρία., intuitus, essential intuition, recourse is had to a consciousness that looks, a recourse so incapable of solving the problem of transcendence, that it is not even capable of seeing the phenomenon of transcendence.
The connection between ideas and looking, θεωρία, intuitus (referred to already in the word ἰδέα), is essential, since the source of the doctrine of ideas is expressed in it. Insofar as being is attributed