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them in their totality. As ἐπέκεινα, the for-the-sake-of-which excells the ideas, but, in excelling them, it determines and gives them the form of wholeness, κοινωνία, communality. If we thus keep in mind the οὗ ἕνεκα characteristic of the highest idea, the connection between the doctrine of ideas and the concept of world begins to emerge: the basic characteristic of world whereby wholeness attains its specifically transcendental form of organization is the for-the-sake-of-which. World, as that to which Dasein transcends, is primarily defined by the for-the-sake-of-which.
But a for-the-sake-of-which, a purposiveness [Umwillen], is only possible where there is a willing [Willen]. Now insofar as transcendence, being-in-the-world, constitutes the basic structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world must also be primordially bound up with or derived from the basic feature of Dasein's existence, namely, freedom. Only where there is freedom is there a purposive for-the-sake-of, and only here is there world. To put it briefly, Dasein's transcendence and freedom are identical! Freedom provides itself with intrinsic possibility; a being is, as free, necessarily in itself transcending.
c) Freedom and world
But now the puzzles begin anew! What is the intrinsic connection between Dasein's freedom, being-in-the-world, and the primary character of world, the purposive for-the-sake-of?
Let us start with the last of these. In our previous account it seemed to be only a formal determination. Dasein, we can say, exists for the sake of something, and now we must still ascertain that for-the-sake-of-which Dasein exists, in terms of its content. What is the final purpose for which humans exist? Here we would seem to have the decisive question. But just seemingly. For the question i s ambiguous. By itself, it seems to go directly to the whole, yet the question is premature. It assumes that it can be somehow decided objectively, while, in the final analysis, the sense of the question itself is such that it is, in each case, only the questioner alone who can pose the question in its real sense and answer it. But if this is the case, then we must show why it is so. In other words, it must become clear from the metaphysics of Dasein why, in conforming to the essence of its being, Dasein must itself take over the question and answer concerning the final purpose, why searching for an objective answer is in itself a or the misunderstanding of human existence in general.
In contrast to truth about extant things, truth about what exists is