And this means that one must take transcendence back into freedom; one must seek the basic essence of transcendence in freedom.
In other words, the world described primarily by the for-the-sake-of is the primordial totality of that which Dasein, as free, gives itself to understand. Freedom gives itself to understand; freedom is the primal understanding, i.e., the primal projection of that which freedom itself makes possible. In the projection of the for-the-sake-of as such, Dasein gives itself the primordial commitment [Bindung]. Freedom makes Dasein in the ground of its essence, responsible [verbindlich] to itself, or more exactly, gives itself the possibility of commitment. The totality of the commitment residing in the for-the-sake-of is the world. As a result of this commitment, Dasein commits itself to a capabi lity of being toward-itself as able-to-be-with others in the ability-to-be-among extant things. Selfhood is free responsibility for and toward itself.
As free, Dasein is world-projection. But this projecting is only projected in such a way that Dasein holds itself in it and does this so that the free hold binds Dasein, i.e., so that the hold puts Dasein, in all its dimensions of transcendence, into a possible clearance space for choice. Freedom itself holds this binding opposite to itself. The world is maintained in freedom counter to freedom itself. The world is the free counter-hold of Dasein's for-the-sake-of. Being-in-the-world is accordingly nothing other than freedom, freedom no longer understood as spontaneity but as defined by the formulation of Dasein's metaphysical essence, which we have described (which is, to be sure, not as yet fully defined).
The free counter-hold of the for-the-sake-of has, however, as transcendence, the character of leaping over each factical and factual being, as was pointed out earlier. World, as the totality of the essential intrinsic possibilities of Dasein as transcending, surpasses all actual beings. Whenever and however they are encountered, actual beings always reveal themselves—precisely when they are disclosed as they are in themselves—only as a restriction, as one possible realization of the possible, as the insufficient out of an excess of possibilities, within which Dasein always maintains itself as free projection.
Dasein is in itself excessive, i.e., defined by a primary insatiability for beings—both metaphysically as such and also existentially, in factic individuation. This primary insatiability can be seen in a definite, ontic, existentiell comportment. Only on the basis of insatiability can there be any settling-down-with, any existentiell peace-of-mind or dissatisfaction. The latter dissatisfaction should not be confused with insatiability, in a metaphysical sense. The essence of freedom, which surpasses every particular factic