§11. Transcendence of Dasein [251-252]

World-entry and its occurrence is the presupposition not for extant things to become first extant and enter into that which manifests itself to us as its extantness and which we understand as such. Rather, world-entry and its occurrence is solely the presupposition for extant things announcing themselves in their not requiring world-entry regarding their own being.

As being-in-the-world, transcending Dasein, in each case, factically provides beings with the opportunity for world-entry, and this provision on the part of Dasein consists in nothing other than in transcending.

If, however, intraworldliness is not a property of intraworldly extant things as extant, where does it belong then and how is it itself? It obviously belongs to world and only is along with it; it only happens insofar as being-in-the-world happens. There is world only insofar as Dasein exists. But then is world not something "subjective"? In fact it is! Only one may not at this point reintroduce a common, subjectivistic concept of "subject." Instead, the task is to see that being-in-the-world, which as existent supplies extant things with entry to world, fundamentally transforms the concept of subjectivity and of the subjective.

When Dasein exists, world-entry has simultaneously also already happened together with it, and it has happened in such a way that extant things entering there in principle undergo nothing. They remain so completely untouched that it is on account of world-entry that Dasein can, on its part, approach, encounter, and touch them. But if what enters world undergoes nothing in the occurrence of world-entry, is then the world itself nothing? In fact the world is nothing-if "nothing" means: not a being in the sense of something extant; also "nothing" in the sense of no-thing, not one of the beings Dasein itself as such transcends; but Dasein transcends itself as well. The world: a nothing, no being- and yet something; nothing of beings-but being. Thus the world is not nothing in the sense of "nihil negativum." What kind of "nihil" is the world and then ultimately being-in-the-world itself?

Here we come upon the question about the intrinsic possibility of transcendence itself, of being-in-the-world as the upswing to a surpassive counter-hold, wherein Dasein makes itself known to itself in its metaphysical essence, so as to bind itself primordially as freedom in this self-understanding. I maintain that the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is time, as primordial temporalityl