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Metaphysics of Principle of Reason [266-267]

such. Expectance means to understand oneself from out of one's own capacity-for-being; one's own capacity-for-being is in tum understood in the essential metaphysical breadth to which belong being-with and being-by. Expecting one's own capability-for-being as mine, I have also come toward myself already and precisely through expecting. This approaching oneself in advance, from one's own possibility, is the primary ecstatic concept of the future. We can illustrate this structure, insofar as this is possible at all, in this way (the question mark indicates the horizon that remains open):


diagram with vector going right to question mark and another underneath returning left

But this coming-to-oneself does not, as such, stretch over a momentary present of my own; it stretches over the whole of my having-been. More precisely — and here is our claim — this having-been-ness temporalizes itself only from out of and in the future. The having-been is not a remnant of myself that has stayed behind and has been left behind by itself. Neither is it what Bergson likes to illustrate with various images: the future unrolls, as it were, while the past is rolled up on another roll, which can be roughly illustrated in the picture below.


diagram with one spiral unrolling into another

Presenting it this way would be correct insofar as the immanent connection of future and having-been-ness are suggested by the picture; but it would be misleading because the has-been is not something remaining by itself, nor is it an accumulating dead weight I haul behind me and to which I could occasionally relate in one way or another. Rather, my having-been only "is:' in each case, according to the mode of the temporalization of the future, and only in the temporalization. What-has-been is, of course, no longer something present, and to that extent one might arrive at the common inference that nothing can be altered; it is finished. This is not the way it is. The having-been-ness, rather, of what-has-been becomes the having-been, first of all and constantly, in the respective future. The very fact that we say "we are not capable of getting rid of the past" indicates a certain mode of our


The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26) by Martin Heidegger