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§12. Transcendence and temporality [270-271]

upswing, regarded as [swinging] toward all possible beings that can factically enter there into a world. The ecstematic temporalizes itself, oscillating as a worlding [Welten]. World entry happens only insofar as something like ecstatic oscillation temporalizes itself as a particular temporality.

World-entry is based on the temporalization of temporality. The primal fact, in the metaphysical sense, is that there is anything like temporality at all. The entrance into world by beings is primal history [Urgeschichte] pure and simple. From this primal history a region of problems must be developed which we are today beginning to approach with greater clarity, the region of the mythic. The metaphysics of myth must come to be understood out of this primal history, and it can be done with the aid of a metaphysical construct of primal time, i.e., the time with which primal history itself begins.

By pointing to the ecstatic and horizonal essence-constitution of time as temporality, our aim was to suggest the intrinsic possibility of transcendence. Only through an exposition of the phenomenon of care could we, at this point, give a more concrete definition of transcendence. We would have to show how facticity and individuation are grounded in temporality, which, as temporalization, unifies itself in itself and individuates in the metaphysical sense, as principium individuationis. But this individuation is the presupposition for the primordial commerce between Dasein and Dasein.

Now you see a distinct correspondence between this and Leibniz's monadology, but also that wherein they differ. Our exposition of the monadology was already guided by the interpretation of Dasein as temporality, especially by an insight into the essence of transcendence. We can say, at this point, that the interpretation of the monadology as I have given it was exaggerated on purpose, and was so in two respects: 1) insofar as we conceived the basic determinations of the monad, repraesentatio and appetitus, primarily as intentional structures; 2) insofar as we clarified the latter as transcendental structures, i.e., in their relatedness to the universe, "world"; for this reason the monad can be defined as a mundus concentratus. The essential difference between Leibniz"s interpretation of the monad and my interpretation of Dasein as temporality lies in the following: in Leibniz the realization of the truly metaphysical sense of his conception is hindered by the fact that he, in principle, places the Cartesian ego cogito at the basis of his conception of the monad, of the I ; that he also takes the monad as a substance enclosed in its sphere, even though he incorporates