Metaphysics of Principle of Reason [271-272]

the whole world in this immanence and its [the monad's] contents. Leibniz can therefore say. Monads need no windows. because they already have everything on the interior. We would say. conversely, they have no windows, not because they have everything within, but because there is neither inside nor outside-because temporalization (drive) in itself implies the ecstatic happening of world-entry, insofar as transcendence is already in itself the possible leap over possible beings that can enter into a world. Thus time is not a mundus concentratus but the converse. Time is essentially a self-opening and expanding into a world. I will not go into the comparison any further, particularly the question of the extent to which one might conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way-just as the monadology is presented as an exposition of the whole universe of beings. This is a question which I myself am not able to decide, one which is still completely unclear to me.

It must also have become clearer to what extent we can say about the world that it is a nothing. What sort of nihil is it? Insofar as we treat world at all, make it a problem and try to prove it is essential, for transcendence, it must be something. If it is a nihil. then it must not be a nihil negativum, i.e., not the simple pure empty negation of something. The world is nothing in the sense that it is nothing that is. It is nothing that is yet something that "is there." The "there is" [Ues" of "es gibt"] which is this not-a-being is itself not being, but is the self-temporalizing temporality. And what the latter, as ecstatic unity, temporalizes is the unity of its horizon, the world. World is the nothing which temporalizes itself primordially. that which simply arises in and with temporalization. We therefore call it the nihil originarium.

Yet the origo of transcendence is temporality itself, and it is origin in such a way that transcendence too, and that means world-entry, happens with temporalization. There is time, in the common sense, only with the temporalization of temporality, with the happening of world-entry. And there are also intratemporal beings, such that transpire "in time," only insofar as world-entry happens and intraworldly beings become manifest for Dasein.

We see then the peculiar productivity intrinsic to temporality, in the sense that the product is precisely a peculiar nothing, the world. Kant, for the first time, came upon this primordial productivity of the "subject" in his doctrine of the transcendental productive imagination. He did not succeed, of course, in evaluating this knowledge in its radical consequences, by which he would have had to, as it were, raze his own building with the help of the

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26) by Martin Heidegger