§13. Temporality and ground [272-274]

new insight. On the contrary, this great intuition was, in principle, lost. Nevertheless, this first advance into the transcendental imagination, which was for Kant only obscurely connected with time, was the first moment in the history of philosophy in which metaphysics endeavored to liberate itself from logic, and from a logic which had not found and never did find its own essence in metaphysics, but remained a training grown superficial and formalistic. Perhaps the true happening in the history of philosophy is always but a temporalization [Zeitigung] of such "moments" in distant intervals and strokes, moments which never become manifest as what they really are. But this productivity of the subject (taken in the transcendental sense) has, as is always the case for something philosophically central, already emerged somewhere in all real philosophy. For example I refer to Heraclitus (Fragment 115): ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων; Dasein is the being that enriches itself out of itself in the manner of understanding. In Dasein itself is essentially the primordial intrinsic possibility of enrichment; Dasein always has the character of being-richer-than, of outstripping.

§ 13. Transcendence temporalizing itself in temporality and the essence of ground

Temporality temporalizes itself primarily out of the future. This means that the ecstatic whole of temporality, and hence the unity of horizon, is determined primarily out of the future. That is the metaphysical way of saying that the world, which is grounded in nothing else than the ecstatic totality of the time horizon, temporalizes itself primarily out of the for-the-sake-of. This for-thesake- of is, in each case, the for-the-sake-of of willing, of freedom, i.e., of the transcending being-toward-oneself. But this for-thesake- of has the intrinsic possibility of such a coming-towardoneself in the mode of binding only in the ecstatic temporalization of the primordial making-present, i.e., in the future in which, or better, as which the backward movement of Dasein constitutes itself. But in its essence, the future is not an isolated or even selfisolating ecstasis. Rather, the more primordially futural, the more retrocursive temporality is, and in this way occurs the whole of temporality and the temporalization of its ecstematic horizon.

Being-in-the-world, transcending toward world, temporalizes itself as temporality and is only possible in this way. This implies that world-entry only happens if temporality temporalizes itself.