be-ing. However, be-ing is the most question-worthy. (Overlooking everything that is decisive, one "can" "read" and use Sein und Zeit as "anthropology" and as a kind of "existential ethics" and so on. But all this has nothing to do with the exclusive thinking-willing of this attempt, that is, with the enquiring unfolding of the question of being as the question concerning the truth of being.)
3. Da-sein means grounding the truth of being through a transformation of man out of a decision for be-ing, that is, what is exclusively worthy of all honouring, although be-ing is neither the "last" nor the "first", but rather the ab-ground, what is sole and unique in the 'in-between'. Therefore, "Da-sein" is incomparable in every respect; it is not an object of a "doctrine" (in Sein und Zeit "investigation" means fundamental questioning, not "explaining" the extant). Da-sein — itself en-owned in en-owning — is nothing that we contrive, but rather what in honouring the most question-worthy we reverently take over and in taking over we just "find".
Because the question of being and along with it also Da-sein is not yet grasped, because one still takes Dasein as the "subject", one arrives at the ridiculous demand that now the individual subject (in Sein und Zeit) would have to be replaced by people as subject. Poor simpletons!
What is fundamental about the resolute disclosedness does not lie in a presumed "subjective" "activity" of the individual but [G145] in the groundership that is charged with Da-sein and belongs to the transformed man; lies in the fundamentally other openness that is primary and is the openness to the truth of being as such; lies in the destruction of the subject-object-relation that sets the measure and founds the ground; lies in the overcoming of all metaphysics.
Groundership means inabiding the exposedness to the 't/here': the Da-sein; it means taking-over 'the t/here-ness' as the clearing of being's ab-ground; and this as the 'in-between' to all "beings".
To understand the inabiding "of" man in the sense of genitivus essentialis is to approach inabiding by taking it as a quality that hangs on to man — it means presupposing man as a subject that is already determined. In truth, that is, in accord with this thinking, inabiding means the anticipatory determination of the fundamental ground "of" man in the direction of which he can first be experienced inabidingly in his ownmost. Inabiding constitutes the "essentia" out of which the title •man" first draws its fundamental naming power.