be named through beingness and to be interpreted exclusively as being out of beingness?

Beingness (constancy and presence) claims to make up the sway of being and thus to determine "beings", and in opposition to itself to determine that which becomes. But whence the "opposition", if an 'other' is not posited through beingness? And how can this be, if beingness itself is not a decision in favor of a measure that beingness itself wants to give (that only the "eternal" and "that which is present" actually "is")? And how can this decision be [G200], if this decision does not separate possibilities and does not withdraw itself from the separation as well as from the separated by not heeding the sphere of decision (of time-space) and fundamentally forgetting that it has nevertheless claimed the temporal?

But where does the decision come from regarding beingness as the sway of being? Does be-ing foster a decision by relinquishing being as beingness to beings? And if so from whom? From man as ζῷον νοῦν (λόγον) ἔχον — from the one who only through this decision and upon this decision as a ground comes to his ownmost without grasping and taking over the swaying ab-ground, perhaps only to begin thereafter a flight from the ownmost (cf. there) .

But of what sway is this decision, that is, the decision that concerns the choice of the sway and the taking over the sway? Which "being" can then take over what is ownmost to itself and at the same time also flee from it?

What must "enown" itself here? Must not man himself be 'owned over' unto the allotment to his ownmost and must not this ownmost be grounded in the allotment unto the truth of be-ing - as yet undecided but steadily to be decided — so that in this way the thrownness unto the swaying of be-ing be grounded; so that be-ing is simply that enownment of the domain of man unto that which is necessitated by the distress of the godhood?

Why does enowning (the sway of be-ing) always foster a decision about its truth and this above all in such a way that even the truth as such remains in forgottenness? And why is this decision ever-first-inceptually a decision about φύσις and thereupon about οὐσία as ἰδέα?

In that be-ing entrusts beings to beingness, that is, in that be-ing admits beingness as being, be-ing refuses itself and thus hides-shelters itself as refusal and preserves itself — traceless and power-less — for the unique gifting.

The refusal enforces the 'gathering' , the 'taking together-unto-one' [G201] and the 'receiving' of the rising presencing (φύσις). It is this